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RENTING THE GOOD LIFE
JIM HAWKINS*
ABSTRACT
Academic literature and court decisions are replete with calls to
ban or severely inhibit the rent-to-own industry. The argument is
simple enough: Rent-to-own firms charge exorbitant prices to the
most needy and vulnerable segments of society.
The case for burdensome regulations, however, is much more
difficult to make out than past scholarship has admitted. For the
most part, academics have proceeded directly to proposing specific
regulations for the industry without first carefully analyzing the
rent-to-own business or the reasons for imposing drastic regulations.
This Article examines the theoretical justifications for regulating
the rent-to-own industry against the backdrop of interviews I
conducted with key participants in the market, recent empirical data
about the industry, and the industry's unique business model. Ifind
that the case for completely banning the rent-to-own transaction is
very weak. On the other hand, guided by insights from behavioral
law and economics, policymakers have strong justifications for
imposing regulations tailored to address the cognitive defects from
which customers are most likely to suffer.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D., University of
Texas School of Law. I am grateful for very helpful comments from Ronald Mann, John
Caskey, Oren Bar-Gill, John Pottow, Mechele Dickerson, Katie Porter, David Crump, Larry
Garvin, and Courtney Hawkins. For information about the industry, I thank Robert Briley
(Aaron Rents), Larry Carrico (Rent One), Christopher Korst (Rent-A-Center), Ernie Lewallen
(UHR Rents, Inc.), Gary Romine (Show Me Rent-to-Own), Geron Vail (FAN Sales & Leasing),
Kim Van Wagner (Aaron Rents), and Ed Winn (Association of Progressive Rental Operators).
For Ruth Hawkins, with love.
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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the case for banning or severely regulating rent-
to-own transactions seems plain enough. The transaction, aimed at
customers with lower incomes, is extremely expensive. In the typical
rent-to-own transaction, a customer acquires ownership of a good by
paying weekly rental payments for the duration of the rental
agreement. The overall cost for the merchandise ends up doubling
or tripling the cost of purchasing it outright at another store. Why
should the poorest members of society pay more to purchase goods
than the rich? If someone from the middle class can walk into
Target and pay $170 for a television, why should a consumer with
a lower income have to pay $500 for the exact same product at Rent-
A-Center?
Academics, courts, and journalists often appeal to the high price
of rent-to-own transactions as an automatic justification for
regulation. The high cost of these transactions, however, turns out
to be a deceptively hollow foundation for imposing burdensome
regulations. The case for severely regulating the rent-to-own
industry is harder to make than past commentary has admitted. In
part, scholarship has failed to justify rent-to-own regulations
because it has neglected to take account of the unique nature of the
rent-to-own transaction, the customers who use this product, and
the business environment in which the industry's firms operate.
Instead of looking at the empirical data on the industry, policy-
makers, courts, and academics have relied on a faulty heuristic to
evaluate the industry: They attempt to force this unique product
into the conceptual category of either a credit sale or a lease.
Take two examples, one from the courts and the other from
academic commentary. In 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,' issued an opinion that determined the
future of rent-to-own in that state. To conclude that rent-to-own
products are really credit sales subject to harsher regulation, the
court made several critical empirical assumptions about the rent-to-
own industry: that customers always intend to obtain ownership of
1. 892 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 2006).
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rent-to-own goods,2 that customers do not value the ability to cancel
their rental agreements,' and that the goods that rent-to-own stores
rent are necessities of life.4 The best empirical data on the industry,
however, reveal that each of these critical assumptions turns out to
be either patently false or at least highly debatable.
Recently, there has been a renewed academic interest in studying
the fringe economy,' including the rent-to-own industry.6 Just like
the judges in Perez, academics have fallen into the same trap of
drawing false conclusions from incorrect empirical assumptions.7
For instance, Camerer et al.'s 2003 Pennsylvania Law Review article
on asymmetric paternalism argues that requiring rent-to-own firms
to disclose implied annual percentage rates (APRs) would not
eliminate consumer choice by limiting the availability of the rent-to-
own transaction.' Interviews I conducted with industry participants,
however, reveal that this is not the case. Requiring APR disclosures
eliminates almost half the market's participants because some
companies refuse to operate in states with APR disclosures.9
2. Id. at 1258.
3. Id. at 1269 n.14.
4. Id. at 1264-65.
5. For a sample of the literature, see Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON
REG. 121 (2004); Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005); Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, Credit Past Due,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 994 (2006); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use
and Preferences Among Low-income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008); Ronald J. Mann
& Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007).
6. E.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform"of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1550 (2006); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1231-32 (2003); Jason
Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Business and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857,
872-73 (2006); James J. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 458-65 (2000).
7. Past scholarship has noted the need for empirical studies to adequately address
regulating this industry. See Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer
Advocates vs. The Rent-to-Own Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accomodation, 34 AM. Bus.
L.J. 385, 393 (1997). Only recently has this data become available.
8. Camerer et. al, supra note 6, at 1231-32.
9. Telephone Interview with Christopher Korst, General Counsel, Rent-A-Center (May
7, 2007) [hereinafter Korst Interview] (on file with author). It is important to ask why
operators dislike APR disclosures so intensely. It might be because APR disclosures allow
customers to compare renting-to-own with other credit products, and operators want to
prevent this comparison through framing rent-to-own transactions in actual costs, not
percentages. This would suggest that operators leave jurisdictions with APR disclosure
20081 2045
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Consumers in Minnesota, a state that requires APR disclosures, 10
may have some choice to use rent-to-own, but it is severely
limited--only seven rent-to-own stores operate in the entire state."
This Article combines the best empirical research on the rent-to-
own industry, most of which has gone unnoticed by legal academics,
with interviews I conducted with key industry participants. It
argues that regulations that prohibit or severely limit the rent-to-
own industry are very difficult to justify. Instead, guided by insights
from behavioral law and economics, policymakers have strong
justifications for imposing narrow regulations tailored to address
the cognitive defects from which customers are most likely to suffer.
Whereas past rent-to-own scholarship has primarily offered
regulatory solutions, 2 this Article proceeds on the premise that the
best regulations are those that address real problems. Using the
unique nature of the rent-to-own transaction and evidence of how
the industry operates, this Article offers justifications for imposing
regulation on this industry.
Much of the data presented in this Article comes from interviews
I conducted with rent-to-own operators. Remarkably, past attempts
to analyze this industry have never looked to the firms populating
the market to understand how the industry functions. This Article
presents the first-ever academic analysis of rent-to-own that is
informed by industry participants.
Part I describes and analyzes the rent-to-own business, address-
ing the transactions, the customers, and the market itself. Far from
being background material, this description and analysis unveil
important aspects of this industry that have gone unnoticed in
the literature. Furthermore, this Part drives my recommendations
requirements because this deceptive framing is fundamental to their business model. I do not
think so. For the explanation of why bona fide operators may be driven out of a market
because of this rule, see infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 279.
11. Ass'n of Progressive Rental Orgs., State RTO Associations--State Rent-to-Own
Statutes and Economic Impact, http://www.rtohq.org/apro-state-rent-to-own-statutes-and-
economic-impact.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter APRO, State RTO Statutes].
12. See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, The Regulation of Rent-to-Own Transactions, 3 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 40 (1991); Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 423-26; James P. Nehf,
Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 751, 815 (1991); Eligio
Pimentel, Renting-to-Own: Exploitation or Market Efficiency?, 13 LAW & INEQ. 369, 399-400
(1995).
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about optimal regulatory policy. Part II evaluates the best argu-
ments for banning or severely regulating the rent-to-own industry.
Concluding that the case for severe regulations is weak, I look to
behavioral law and economics to chart out the conceptual justifica-
tions for narrow, tailored rent-to-own regulations. Part III concludes
by critically analyzing specific rent-to-own regulations-some of
which are currently law and some of which I propose as new
regulations.
I. THE RENT-TO-OWN BUSINESS
Mapping out a basic analysis of the rent-to-own business turns
out to be a relatively complicated task, but the work is well worth
it. A rich understanding of how this business operates is essential
to determining what regulations are justified. This Part considers
three key elements of the industry in turn: the transaction itself, the
customer base, and the market.
A. The Rent-to-Own Transaction
The basics of the rent-to-own transaction are easy to describe:
Customers agree to pay weekly or monthly rental payments, and
stores deliver merchandise to the customer's home and take on the
responsibility to service the merchandise.13 The store, however,
retains title to the goods.14 If the customer decides to terminate the
contract or stops making the payments, the store takes back the
merchandise.15 Although the customer does not have any ownership
interest in the property based on the prior payments, the customer
also does not have any obligation to continue making payments. 6 If
the customer makes all the payments required under the contract,
13. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, RAC Worry-free Guarantee, http://www6.rentacenter.coml
site/page/pg4283-pnRentToOwn.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008); see also Ass'n of
Progressive Rental Orgs., About Rent-to-Own-Rent-to-Own Industry Overview, http://www.
rtohq.org/apro-rto-industry-overview.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter AFRO,
Industry Overview].
14. See APRO, Industry Overview, supra note 13.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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the customer acquires title to the merchandise.17 The customer can
also obtain ownership at any point during the pendency of the
contract by making a lump payment-usually the aggregate of the
total remaining payments discounted by some percentage, depend-
ing on how early in the contract the consumer makes the payment.1
8
1. Disguised Credit Sales or True Leases? (Or Who Cares?)
Though the transaction is easy to describe, it is difficult to
categorize. A debate has raged for years about whether rent-to-own
transactions are leases or credit sales.'9 Traditionally, academics
have allowed this debate to consume the discussion of renting-to-
own: 'The controversy about rent-to-own is based on identifying the
essential nature of the agreement."2 ° Like most debates about the
rent-to-own business, this debate has the potential to have real
consequences. If rent-to-own transactions are really credit sales
under existing law, then they are subject to the Truth in Lending
Act,2' and they have extremely high APRs.22 Also, if the transactions
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Barkley Clark et al., "Rent-to-Own" Agreements in Bankruptcy: Sales or
Leases?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 115, 115 (1994) ("[T]he proper characterization of rent-to-
own transactions has been subject to substantial debate over the past ten years."); Ingrid
Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Section 365 in the Consumer Context: Something
Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 104 COM. L.J. 377, 412 (1999)
("Much litigation, both in and outside of bankruptcy, has focused on characterizing the true
nature of a [rent-to-own] transaction."); James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with
Rent-to-Own Transactions, 21 J. PUB. POLY & MARKETING 126, 126 (2002) (describing that
"the nature of the transaction has been controversial"); Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at
417 ('The most significant legal issue for [rent-to-own] operators has been whether a [rent-to-
own] transaction is a sale or a lease.'); Nehf, supra note 12, at 788 ("Perhaps the most often
litigated [rent-to-own] issue is whether the [rent-to-own] contract should be characterized as
a true lease or as a security agreement."); Pimentel, supra note 12, at 373 ('The pivotal issue
with respect to [rent-to-own] contracts is whether they should be characterized as a lease or
a sale.").
20. Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Purchases or
Rentals?, 20 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 13, 14 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson & Jackson, Rent-to-Own
Agreements].
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2000).
22. Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, A Reconsideration of Rent-to-Own, 35 J.
CONSUMERAFF. 295,303 (2001) [hereinafter Anderson & Jackson, A Reconsideration] ("When
viewed simply as installment contracts, the implied APRs are indeed extremely high even
when the value of additional services provided by the [rent-to-own] firms are included in the
2048
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are credit sales, a customer has a higher likelihood of keeping
possession of rented goods in bankruptcy because she can often
retain ownership of the goods for less than what she owes the
store.23 If rent-to-own transactions are leases, on the other hand, a
debtor in bankruptcy who wishes to keep the goods must (1) cure
the default on the contract by paying everything due to date, and (2)
assume the contract, paying the full amount due. 24 Additionally, if
these transactions are credit sales, customers have more rights
upon defaulting on the agreement outside of bankruptcy under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) because they
have rights to be given notice of a sale, to redeem the goods, and to
be paid any surplus of a sale. 25 But in the event of default under
Article 2A of the U.C.C., which governs leases, a lessee has no right
to notice of enforcement, and a lessor can repossess the goods
without judicial process and without giving the lessee any residual
value the lessee may have in the goods. 26 The disparate treatment
calculations.").
23. If the rent-to-own transaction is a credit sale, the firm has a "purchase-money security
interest" in the asset the customer is renting, U.C.C. § 9-103(b) (2007), but the customer owns
it, so, as a general rule, the asset becomes the property of the bankruptcy estate when an
individual files for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000). In a case filed under either
Chapter 7 or 13, a debtor may recover the assets at a lower price than she actually owes.
When the customer declares bankruptcy under Chapter 7, she may:
redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or
household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such
property is exempted under section 522 of this title ... by paying the holder of
such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured
by such lien in full at the time of redemption.
Id. § 722. A rent-to-own good is exempt property, and thus eligible for redemption under
§ 722, if (1) the state where the debtor is domiciled has not "opted-out" of the federal
exemptions, id. § 522(b), or the good is exempt under the state's provision; and (2) the
individual asset is worth less than $525, or $1,350 if the asset is jewelry. Id. § 522(d)(3)-(4).
So, instead of the debtor paying the full amount of the debt owed in order to retain the good,
the debtor would only have to pay the value of the collateral, i.e., the amount of the allowed
secured claim defined in § 506(a), to redeem it. When filing under Chapter 13, she may retain
the property through a reaffirmation agreement, potentially for an amount less than owed
before bankruptcy, id. § 524; or through making periodic payments under the plan. Id. §
1325(a)(5)(B)(I)(aa); see also Clark et al., supra note 19, at 122-24; Hillinger & Hillinger, supra
note 19, at 409-10.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2006).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-611 (2007) (providing right to notice of sale); id. § 9-615 (providing right
to surplus from sale); id. § 9-623 (providing right of redemption).
26. See U.C.C. § 2A-502 (2007) (disavowing the right to notice after default); § 2A-525
(providing lessor's right to repossession).
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afforded to secured transactions and leases emanates from a more
fundamental distinction: The customer forfeits all equity she has in
the goods in the context of a lease, but she retains her residual
interest if the transaction is a credit sale.
Academics and courts have proffered numerous arguments to
prove that rent-to-own transactions are really credit sales in
disguise. The most important argument is that rent-to-own trans-
actions are credit sales because they are structured like credit
sales-customers obtain ownership of durable goods over time
through periodic payments.27 In addition, others argue that
customers perceive the transactions as credit transactions;28 that
the name of "rental-purchase" reveals the transactions as disguised
sales;29 that consumers "b[ear] the risk of loss, [are] responsible for
paying the sales tax, [and are] the beneficiaries of warranty
provisions";3 ° and that most consumers complete the rental agree-
ments and obtain ownership.31 Analysis of public firms' annual
reports adds an additional argument in favor of categorizing rent-
27. See Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1268 (N.J. 2006); JOHN P. CASKEY,
LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST FINANCIAL SERVICES 49 (1997); HOWARD KARGER,
SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 105 (2005); Ronald Paul Hill et al.,
The Rent-to-Own Industry and Pricing Disclosure Tactics, 17 J. PUB. POLY & MARKETING 3,
3 (1998); Johnston, supra note 6, at 872; Roger M. Swagler & Paula Wheeler, Rental-Purchase
Agreements: A Preliminary Investigation of Consumer Attitudes and Behaviors, 23 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 145, 146 (1989).
28. See Manoj Hastak, Regulation of the Rent-to-Own Industry: Implications of the
Wisconsin Settlement with Rent-A-Center, 23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 89, 90 (2004).
Consumer behavior in bankruptcy may bolster this claim because "[d]ebtors in bankruptcy
who have [rent-to-own] contracts typically list them as either unsecured or secured debts, and
not as leases." Nathaniel C. Nichols, The Poor Need Not Apply: Moralistic Barriers to
Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 329, 356 (1994).
29. See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 19, at 414 (discussing In re Jarrells, 205 B.R. 994
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1997)).
30. Id. at 414-15 (discussing In re Goin, 141 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992)).
31. This claim is extremely contentious by itself. Two contrasting studies, coming to very
different results, are good examples of the two major positions in the debate. The FTC's
extensive survey of rent-to-own customers found that 71 percent of rent-to-own goods were
purchased by the customer within two years. JAMES M. LACKO ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N,
SURVEY OF RENT-TO-OWN CUSTOMERS 56 (2000) [hereinafter FTC SURVEY]. Anderson and
Jackson analyzed thousands of transactions drawn from 100 rent-to-own stores in 46 states
and concluded based on these transactions that 39.09 percent of agreements lead to
ownership. Anderson & Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements, supra note 20, at 18. Both the
FTC's survey and Anderson and Jackson's papers criticize the other's empirical methods. See
id. at 16; Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 135.
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to-own transactions as credit sales. Rent-to-own companies them-
selves see the transaction as a replacement for credit sales."
The main justification for categorizing rent-to-own transactions
as leases and not credit sales is that these transactions permit
customers to cancel the contract at any time with absolutely no
further obligation to pay.3 Also, the dealer, not the customer, has
the obligation to maintain and repair the product.34 Courts inter-
vene to treat these transactions as secured loans, we are told, only
to protect consumers.35 Advocates also point to evidence that many
agreements do not lead to ownership as proof that renting-to-own
should be thought of as a lease.36
This debate has outlived its usefulness to regulators-both
because current laws do not require us to fit rent-to-own into one of
these two categories and because the transaction has aspects of
both credit sales and leases. Although it is true that there are
significant implications under current commercial law if rent-to-own
32. See Aaron Rents, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at Item 1 (Feb. 28, 2007) ("Our
sales and lease ownership division focuses on providing durable household goods to lower to
middle income consumers who have limited or no access to traditional credit sources such as
bank financing, installment credit or credit cards."); Rent-A-Center, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 1, 2007) (stating that renting-to-own allows consumers "to obtain
merchandise that they might otherwise be unable to obtain due to insufficient cash resources
or a lack of access to credit"); Rent-Way, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Dec. 29, 2005)
("[T]he rental-purchase business offers an alternative to traditional retail installment sales
33. For instance, despite the statute's plain language, one bankruptcy court refused to
treat a rent-to-own transaction as a credit sale because it would lead to an absurd result:
"Such an interpretation would call an agreement a contract of sale even though it lacked one
of the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely an obligation to pay the purchase price
agreed upon." In re Colin, 136 B.R. 856, 858 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991); see also Brian S. Prestes,
Comment, Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to Housing Leases, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 865, 885-86 (2000) ("Mere payment in the form of installments does not render a lease
a credit transaction .... [A] lease that is paid in installments, where the installment payments
are merely payments for contemporaneous use of the good and nothing more, is not a credit
transaction because the lessor is only providing the lessee with the right to enjoy that which
he has paid for to-date.").
34. See Michael L. Walden, The Economics of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 24 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 326, 326 (1990).
35. See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 19, at 417. Perez provides support for this claim.
There, the court admitted that the statutory language protecting consumers did not cover
rent-to-own transactions, but it nevertheless extended the protection because of the mandate
to liberally construe consumer protection statutes. Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d
1255, 1267-68 (N.J. 2006).
36. See supra note 31.
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transactions are credit sales or leases, rent-to-own is almost always
defined by specific regulations, so these distinctions are inapposite."
Consider, for instance, the California Rental-Purchase Act.38 That
Act defines a rental-purchase agreement just as the transaction is
described above,39 and explicitly states: "A rental-purchase agree-
ment is a lease ... [and] shall not be construed to be ... [a] retail
installment sale, ... [a] retail installment contract, ... [a] retail
installment account, ... [a] lease or agreement that constitutes a
security interest, ... [or a] consumer credit contract .... ,,4' As a legal
matter, the credit sale/lease question in states like California is of
no practical importance because the legislature has already
provided the definitive answer.
In the current legal landscape, the reason that academics, courts,
and regulators attempt to classify rent-to-own transactions as credit
sales or leases is because these two concepts provide regulators with
a heuristic device for regulating.41 If renting-to-own is a credit sale,
we will regulate it using principles we have developed for regulating
other credit sales; if it is a lease, we will regulate it like a lease.42 As
the persuasive arguments for both sides of this debate indicate,
however, rent-to-own transactions are neither leases nor credit
sales. They participate in some attributes of both of these transac-
37. Only three states do not have industry-specific regulations: New Jersey, Wisconsin,
and North Carolina. See APRO, State RTO Statutes, supra note 11.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.620-.649 (West 2007).
39. Id. § 1812.622(d) ('Rental-purchase agreement,' ... means an agreement between a
lessor and a consumer pursuant to which the lessor rents or leases, for valuable consideration,
personal property for use by a consumer for personal, family, or household purposes for an
initial term not exceeding four months that may be renewed or otherwise extended, if under
the terms of the agreement the consumer acquires an option or other legally enforceable right
to become owner of the property.").
40. Id.
41. See Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalistic Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY411,415-18 (2007) (explaining that legislators, as much as consumers, are "boundedly
rational").
42. For an excellent discussion of the differences between leases and credit sales, see
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing:
A Critique of Proposals To Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 683, 691-96
(1988). For a trenchant criticism of the sale-lease distinction, see John D. Ayer, On the
Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667, 667-84 (1983).
[Vol. 49:20412052
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tions.43 Regulators need to abandon this credit sale/lease dichotomy
and refocus the debate on the unique characteristics of rent-to-own.
2. Characteristics for Regulators To Consider
Instead of relying on the traditional heuristic policymakers used
to approach rent-to-own transactions, this section discusses the
unique characteristics of rent-to-own transactions that regulators
should take into account when crafting policy.
a. A Single Decision for Goods and Terms of Acquisition
In many situations where consumers acquire goods, the consumer
makes one decision about what good to purchase and a completely
distinct decision about how to pay for the good-either by a credit
card, a loan, or cash. In the rent-to-own transaction, however, the
what and the how are collapsed together into one decision. If a
consumer likes the furniture at a specific rent-to-own store, the
consumer must accept the store's rental agreement to obtain the
goods. This feature is significant for regulators to consider because
it could lead to customers focusing exclusively on one aspect of the
transaction-most likely the goods themselves-and neglecting to
consider carefully the terms under which they will pay for the goods.
For instance, interviewees explained to me that rent-to-own firms
43. Many economists, both those who oppose and support the rent-to-own industry,
recognize the complexity of this transaction as a hybrid between a credit sale and a lease. See
Signe-Mary McKernan, James M. Lacko & Manoj Hastak, Empirical Evidence on the
Determinants of Rent-to-Own Use and Purchase Behavior, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 33, 37 (2003);
Walden, supra note 34, at 326-27. Anderson and Jackson have specifically articulated how
renting-to-own is a hybrid transaction:
One approach is to look at [a rent-to-own] contract as a series of payments that
purchase a bundle of services and financial instruments that includes (1) the
service of the product for the time period, (2) a put option with a zero strike price
that expires at the end of the period, and (3) an option to acquire a call with a
zero strike price when the final rent-to-own payment is made. A decision not to
make the next payment means the consumer no longer has the services of the
product, exercises the put option by selling the merchandise back to the dealer-
owner at a zero price, and foregoes the option to acquire a call on the product.
Through time, as the final payment approaches, the value of the put option
should decline while the value of the call option increases.
Anderson & Jackson, A Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 301.
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compete on the quality and selection of goods at a store44 and on the
personal relationships store personnel develop with clients.4" Price
and other contract terms are not salient terms for customers, and
regulators must decide what to do with terms that are not suscepti-
ble to competitive forces.
b. Multiple In-person Payment Decisions
The rent-to-own transaction functions like a series of successive
contracts. Because the customer can always cancel the contract,
each time a customer pays for the next period's rent, the customer
must decide again whether to continue using and acquiring the
merchandise through this vehicle or abandon the contract, perhaps
to purchase the goods another way. Usually, customers make pay-
ments in person, in cash, at the store itself,46 and typically, these
payments are made on a weekly basis.4" One interviewee estimated
that 85 percent of customers pay at the store in person each week.48
This feature raises several concerns regulators may consider.
First, the successive points of agreement may complicate any
disclosure regime, requiring multiple disclosures instead of a single
disclosure at the initial time of purchase. When using credit cards,
for instance, borrowers face multiple points of decision. They make
decisions when they sign the credit card agreement, when they
make a purchase, and when they decide whether to pay off the
balance or borrow.49 Regulators need to consider what dangers await
customers both at the initial decision to rent and at the successive
decisions to continue renting.
44. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
45. Telephone Interview with Larry Carrico, Owner, Rent One (May 22,2007) [hereinafter
Carrico Interview] (on file with author).
46. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6.
47. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6 ("Approximately 86% of our agreements are
on a weekly term."). Rent-A-Center allows customers to pick whether they want to pay weekly
or monthly, but most customers pick weekly payments. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
48. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
49. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGUIATION OF PAYMENT
CARD MARKETS 129 (2006). For the potential regulatory implications of this feature in credit
cards, see id. at 160-65 (proposing that disclosures be made to consumers both at the point
of sale and at the point of borrowing).
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Second, because customers come into the store each week to make
payments, rent-to-own firms have a tremendous business opportu-
nity to encourage customers to rent more products. Rent-to-own
firms admit that repeat business is important,50 and critics have
been quick to suggest that stores abuse this feature.5' Firms say
that they use weekly payments "to strengthen customer relation-
ships and make these customers feel welcome in our stores."52
Policymakers are left to sort out how this repetitive personal
interaction affects the dynamic between customers and salespeople.
c. Fee Bundling and Behavior-driven Pricing
Rent-to-own firms include many services as part of the rental
agreement without any additional costs, such as same-day delivery,
installation, repair or replacement, and pick-up.53 Customers also
have the option to have other services bundled 4 into the contract at
extra costs, such as insurance in the form of optional loss/damage
waivers55 or in the form of participation in preferred customer
programs.56 John Caskey reports that "[a]lmost all [rent-to-own
50. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32 ("In order to increase rentals at existing stores,
we foster relationships with existing customers to attract recurring business, and many new
rental and lease ownership agreements are attributable to repeat customers."); Rent-A-
Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1 ('We estimate that approximately 70% of our business is from
repeat customers."); Telephone Interview with Ernie Lewallen, President, UHR Rents, Inc.
(July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Lewallen Interview] (on file with author); Telephone Interview
with Geron Vail, Owner, FAN Sales & Leasing (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Vail Interview]
(on file with author).
51. See KARGER, supra note 27, at 93-94 (recounting the plight of an interviewee who
obtained a refrigerator she needed for $30 a week but later was persuaded by the salesperson
to rent a better refrigerator and a television, resulting in payments of $120 a week); Will
Rodgers, On a Roll, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 16, 2005, at 1 (discussing an interview with a professor
who argued that firms require weekly payments for the specific purpose of selling customers
more goods).
52. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32.
53. See, e.g., id.; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1, 6; Rent-Way, Inc., supra note
32, at 4.
54. I follow here Oren Bar-Gill's definition of a "bundled" product, which includes "any
case where a consumer purchasing product A from seller X has a sufficiently strong incentive
to purchase product B from the same seller." Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer
Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 34 (2006).
55. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6.
56. See, e.g., Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 4. Some states forbid operators from
offering bundled services. See infra Part III.D.
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firms] encourage customers to buy theft and property damage
insurance" and that "the vast majority of customers purchase such
coverage."57 One example of a preferred customer program is the
program offered by Rent One, a large regional chain. If a customer
pays to join the "CARE Plus Program," the customer receives extra
benefits such as sales and discounts, payment waivers, and the
ability to reinstate a terminated agreement at any time. 58 Rent
One's owner estimates that 50-60 percent of customers pay to join
this program. 9
In addition to these optional fees, rent-to-own firms also charge
behavior-driven fees. These fees can include late fees,6' reinstate-
ment fees, 1 and collection fees on delinquent accounts. The risk to
consumers of behavior-driven fees is higher for this financial service
than for other services, like credit cards and installment loans,
because payments are typically due once a week and are usually
paid in cash, unlike other industries that accept payments once
a month, often through an automatic withdrawal. 3 Rent-to-own
operators report that these fees generate revenue, but they claim
the fees are important because, as both a stick and a carrot, fees
allow stores to encourage customers to pay their rent and avoid
forfeiting the merchandise.' Though not unique to the rent-to-own
57. CASKEY, supra note 27, at 49; see also Hill et al., supra note 27, at 6 ("[Mlany
customers believed they were pushed to purchase 'insurance' that protected the retailer from
loss due to theft, arson, or natural disasters such as fire. Some informants held that they were
charged for such services without their explicit permission.").
58. See Rent One, The Care Plus Program, http://rentone-rto.com/index.php?page=
aboutcareplus (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
59. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
60. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 14.
61. See, e.g., id. at 6.
62. See, e.g., id. Like bundled services, some states limit the amount firms may charge
customers. See infra Part III.D.
63. See Rodgers, supra note 51; Telephone Interview with Gary Romine, Owner, Show-Me
Rent-to-Own (May 22,2007) [hereinafter Romine Interview] (on file with author); see also Hill
et al., supra note 27, at 4 (noting evidence that "more than 60% of [Rent-A-Center's]
customers make late payments at any given time").
64. See Carrico Interview, supra note 45; Interview with Kim Van Wagner, Dir. of
Franchise Dev., Aaron Rents (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Van Wagner Interview] (on file with
author); Vail Interview, supra note 50; see also Lewallen Interview, supra note 50 (noting that
fees are important to incentivize payments and to prevent large opportunity cost losses that
stores face when customers keep merchandise without paying for it, precluding stores from
renting the goods to other customers).
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business, bundled and behavior-driven fees may be particularly
attractive targets for regulation because these fees prey on cognitive
weaknesses that many consumers possess, such as the tendency to
procrastinate.
d. The Risk of Losing Equity
Customers do not obtain any ownership rights in rented goods
until they complete the contract. Regardless of whether the cus-
tomer has paid one week's rental payment of $30, or seventy weeks'
payment of $2,100, the customer has the exact same ownership
interest in the goods. Customer payments to a rent-to-own store can
be divided into a rental component, consisting of the reasonable
rental costs, and an equity component, consisting of the excess
payments that should amortize the value of the customer's interest.
But, unlike a secured transaction where a customer has a right to
recoup equity even in the event of default,65 the rent-to-own
customer is left with nothing if a payment is missed.66 For centuries,
courts have forbidden contracts in which borrowers forfeit equity
in land, and regulators must determine if the policy concerns
animating that long-held rule apply in this industry.
e. High Switching Costs
After a customer has made payments to a specific rent-to-own
firm, the customer faces high costs in switching to another firm or
another product. A customer who has made even one-third of her
payments on a product will face high costs to start the process over
at another firm with, for instance, more favorable contract terms,
because she will have to pay for the entire rental period at the
new firm.6" It is not surprising that only 14 percent of people who
65. See U.C.C. § 9-615(d) (2007).
66. Most states require rent-to-own firms to reinstate agreements for a short time after
the agreement terminates. After that period ends, however, the customers retain no interest
in the merchandise. See infra Part III.C.
67. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms for Regulating
Consumer Credit, 73 TENN. L. REV. 303, 307-10 (2006).
68. Notice this is different from the potential for customers to lose equity. The high cost
of switching relates to the new costs a customer will have to pay when starting a rental
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terminate their retail agreements do so in order to obtain the
goods from another source.69 Regulators need to consider the high
switching costs in this transaction because when these costs are too
high, firms are more likely to impose abusive terms on their current
customers because these customers have nowhere else to go.7"
B. The Rent-to-Own Customer
In addition to understanding the unique characteristics of
this transaction, discovering the optimal rent-to-own regulations
requires identifying exactly who rents-to-own. Interviews with
industry participants, recent extensive empirical studies, and the
annual reports of publicly held rent-to-own firms reveal some
remarkable attributes of rent-to-own customers.
For instance, based on evidence from interviews and annual
reports, this Article makes the novel argument that customers rent
neither low quality merchandise nor necessities from rent-to-own
dealers. Instead, the goods people rent primarily enhance the
quality of their lives. This new understanding has dramatic policy
consequences. It unveils the crass, aggressive paternalism used to
justify a ban on the industry: Advocates of a ban wish to stop poorer
renters from getting things that are "too nice." But, it also under-
mines the argument that regulators should not ban rent-to-own
because consumers need this option to survive. The harms of a ban
are less significant because the ban would only prevent customers
from enhancing the quality of their lives. It would not prevent them
from having access to any durable goods.
Additionally, based on recent survey data, this Article explores
the amazing lack of market segmentation among different types of
rent-to-own customers. People with different economic and credit
backgrounds utilize rent-to-own, and some rent for a short time
while others rent until they own the merchandise. Everyone,
however, rents on the exact same terms. This lack of market
agreement over at a new firm. The loss of equity refers to loss of the residual value a customer
has built up by making payments that exceed the reasonable rental costs.
69. FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 62.
70. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 388.
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segmentation provides the groundwork for the most compelling
argument in favor of banning the industry: the potential that this
industry promotes a regressive cross-subsidy.
Several surveys provide information about the general character-
istics of rent-to-own customers, but the most important of these
surveys was conducted by the FTC between December 1998 and
February 1999.71 In many ways, the FTC Survey's findings match
what we might expect about rent-to-own customers: "Compared with
respondents who had not used [rent-to-own] transactions, [rent-to-
own] customers were significantly more likely to be African
American, younger, and less educated; have a lower income; have
children in the household; rent their residence; live in the South;
and live in nonsuburban areas. 72 Other data sources, including
rent-to-own companies' own annual reports, confirm that rent-to-
own companies target individuals with lower incomes.73
Some of the FTC's data, however, is more surprising. Though
customers may have lower incomes, the FTC found that nearly
84 percent had a car or truck, virtually the same percentage as
the general public.74 Rent-to-own customers also have more access
to credit than one might assume: 44 percent of customers had
credit cards, compared to 68 percent in the general population; 64
percent had a checking account, compared to 87 percent in the
general population; and 49 percent had a savings account, com-
pared to 56 percent in the general population.75 What is unknown,
71. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 129. The FTC surveyed 12,136 people, yielding 532
people that qualified under the Survey's parameters as rent-to-own customers. Id.
72. Id. at 130.
73. See KARGER, supra note 27, at 99 ("[Rent-to-own] marketing predominantly targets
low-income consumers by advertising in media located in buses and around public housing
projects that target people of color. The industry also promotes features attractive to low-
income consumers: quick delivery, weekly payments, no or small down payments, quick repair
service, no credit checks, and no harm to one's credit if one cancels the transaction."). Some
rent-to-own firms admit that they target such individuals. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note
32 (stating that stores are "strategically located in established working class neighborhoods
and communities"); id. ("We assist each franchisee in selecting the proper site for each store.
Because of the importance of location to the Aaron's Sales & Lease Ownership concept ....");
Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 3 ('The Company uses a variety of information sources to
identify store locations that are readily accessible to low and middle income customers.").
74. FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 45 (reporting that 83.7 percent of customers using rent-
to-own in the last year owned a car or truck, compared to 84 percent of all U.S. households).
75. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 130. John Caskey's research found similar results: He
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unfortunately, is how credit cards and savings accounts interact
with rent-to-own transactions. Do customers turn to rent-to-own
only when their credit cards have reached their limits, or is renting-
to-own their first choice?76 Do people have savings sufficient to
pay for rent-to-own merchandise upfront, or do people only use
the product when their savings accounts are depleted? Although
no empirical data specifically answer these questions, evidence
suggests that people use rent-to-own as a substitute for credit or
savings.77
Two important aspects of customers in this industry deserve an
extended discussion: the types of goods customers rent and the
industry's refusal to segment the market between different types of
customers.
1. The Merchandise Consumers Rent
For many consumer credit products, regulators have little
information about what consumers are using the credit to buy, so it
is difficult to assess whether consumers are using loan proceeds
judiciously. Do they pay for essential medical services or gamble and
purchase drugs?7 8 In the rent-to-own industry, on the other hand,
we know exactly what people are renting-both from the FTC
survey data and from rent-to-own firms' annual reports. Table 1
below presents information from these sources, displaying the types
of goods that people rent from rent-to-own stores.
found that 36.7 percent of customers carry general use credit cards and 65.3 percent had some
type of deposit account. CASKEY, supra note 27, at 29 tbl.8.
76. See Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 135. Professor Manning has suggested that people
use rent-to-own only after they are fully extended on credit cards. Rodgers, supra note 51.
Without survey data, however, this claim would be hard to prove. One industry participant
related his experience that customers will lease merchandise, even though they could have
purchased the products on their credit cards, because people want to keep open credit for both
future living expenses and emergencies. Van Wagner Interview, supra note 64.
77. See infra Part II.A.5.
78. See, e.g., Mann & Hawkins, supra note 5, at 859 n.6 ('There is little information about
the most common uses of the borrowed funds [for payday loans].").
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Table 1: Rent-to-Own Merchandise as a Percentage of Store
Revenue
Rent-A-Cen- Aaron Rents'" Rent-Way' FTC Survey 2
ter"_
Electronics 42% 33% 35% 38%
Appliances 16% 15% 16% 25%
Furniture 32% 33% 30% 36%
Computers 10% 15% 17% 2%
Other _ 4% 1%
Jewelry 1 1 2% 1%
In addition to knowing what types of goods people rent, we can
obtain a sense of the quality of this merchandise by examining rent-
to-own firms' annual reports. Earlier in this industry's history,
critics asserted that rent-to-own companies carried old, worn-out,
inferior goods. 3 This charge is almost certainly inaccurate, however.
Rent-A-Center's and Aaron Rents's annual reports emphatically and
painstakingly illustrate the fact that rent-to-own companies offer
top-quality, name-brand goods.' Though some degree of puffery
79. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 5-6.
80. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32.
81. Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 3 (figures rounded to the nearest whole number).
82. FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 51 tbl.4.2 (figures rounded to the nearest whole
number and presented as a percentage of consumer's reported behavior).
83. See Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and
a Car, 2000 WiS. L. REV. 1221, 1249 ("Welfare recipients ... spend millions of dollars annually
at rent-to-own dealers trying to become owners of cheaply-made, exorbitantly-priced
household durables." (citations omitted)); Angie Newsome, Rent-to-Own Stores Offer the
Goods; But Critics Wonders [sic] if Payment Plans Are Worthwhile, Even for People with Bad
Credit, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 6C (explaining that rent-to-own dealers
in the past offered damaged goods).
84. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32 ("We carry well-known brands such as JVC®,
Mitsubishi®, Philips®, RCA®, Sony®, Dell®, Hewlett-Packard®, La-Z-Boyg, Simmons®,
Frigidaire®, General Electric@ and Maytag®."); Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1 ("Our
stores generally offer high quality, durable products .... We offer well known brands such as
Sony, Philips, LG, Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi home electronics, Whirlpool appliances,
Dell, Toshiba and Hewlett-Packard computers and Ashley, England, Berkline and Standard
furniture."); id. at 4 (noting its "reputation as a leading provider of high quality branded
merchandise and services"); id. at 5 ("We seek to provide a wide variety of high quality
merchandise to our customers, and we emphasize high-end products from name-brand
manufacturers."); Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 14 ('CThe Company offers quality brand
name home entertainment equipment, furniture, computers, major appliances, and jewelry
... "); id. at 3 ('The Company's product line currently includes the Sharp, RCA, JVC, Phillips
and Panasonic brands of home entertainment equipment; the Ashley, Bassett, Catnapper,
Progressive and England Corsair brands of furniture; the Dell and IBM brand of personal
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may be involved in these claims, a review of Rent-A-Center's
website, for example, reveals that Rent-A-Center does rent top
quality goods. It offers Sony laptop computers with Pentium chips85
and front load washing machines.5 6
Although we may know the types of goods people rent and the
quality of those goods, it is more difficult to determine whether rent-
to-own goods rented are necessities essential for modern life or
luxury goods meant to enhance customers' quality of life. Some
members of the rent-to-own industry contend the goods are
necessities for families-people need beds for sleeping, washers
for laundry, and computers for homework assignments.87 Creola
Johnson has argued at some length against the "myth" that rent-to-
own customers seek out luxury goods. 8 She claims that rent-to-own
goods--even computers and televisions-represent essential goods
in modern society.89 Even the harshest critics of this industry agree
that some rent-to-own products are essential products. For instance,
Robert Manning has admitted that "he understands people who
don't have money to buy a refrigerator getting one on a rental
contract because there's food spoiling at home."9 °
Though the case has not yet been articulated, this Article
contends that rent-to-own goods are not primarily essential goods
but instead are goods that enhance the quality of customers' lives.
Some merchandise falls outside the category of necessary goods
computers; and Crosley, Sears Kenmore and General Electric brands of major appliances.").
85. Rent-A-Center: Sony VAIO, http://www6.rentacenter.com/sitelpage/pg4313-as 105901-
ba22-pn.SonyyAIOVGNN325EBC.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
86. Rent-A-Center: Whirlpool, http'J/www6.rentacenter.com/site/page/pg4313as876balO-
pnWhirlpoolWFW8300SW.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
87. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
88. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 1249-71.
89. See id. at 1250 ("Contrary to the myth, the majority of rent-to-own customers do not
pursue ownership of true luxury items, such as big-screen televisions or stereo entertainment
systems.... In twenty-first century America, furniture and appliances are non-discretionary
goods ...."); id. at 1251 ("In addition to basic household durables, at least one television is a
necessity for single-parent families.... Personal computers are also becoming necessities,
because they have revolutionized the ways we both learn and earn."). Other academics share
Johnson's view. See Anderson & Jackson, A Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 304.
90. Rodgers, supra note 51; see also Newsome, supra note 83 ("Celeste Collins, director
of the Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Western North Carolina, said she has
recommended the [rent-to-own] service only once. Then, a client didn't have a washing
machine or a car and lugged her laundry on the bus-with her children-to the coin-operated
laundry.").
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altogether, and even those goods that are essentials are nicer than
alternatives available in the market, suggesting that they function
to enhance quality of life.
As Table 1 demonstrates, around a third of the merchandise
rented is electronics, a category that does not include personal
computers. Although the annual reports do not break this category
down further, an industry source suggests that 10 percent of mer-
chandise revenue comes from televisions,91 and in the FTC Survey,
people reported that 18.6 percent of the goods rented were televi-
sions.92 Whereas televisions may be essential in a modern home, as
Professor Johnson suggests, they are not essentials in the same way
refrigerators or beds are necessary for life. 3 Some electronics would
be accepted widely as luxury goods, such as "high definition televi-
sions, home theatre systems, video game consoles and stereos from
top name-brand manufacturers."94
Moreover, even goods that are considered necessities serve to
enhance the quality of rent-to-own consumers' lives because firms
provide top-quality, name-brand merchandise. Such goods necessar-
ily cost more than lower-quality, off-brand goods or goods at thrift
shops. Evidence from the industry's annual reports suggests that at
least some firms see the role of rent-to-own products as enhancing
the quality of renters' lives. Aaron Rents notes that it "enables these
customers to obtain quality-of-life enhancing merchandise."95 The
industry also recognizes that customers who obtain used goods
from rent-to-own firms get a significantly better product than they
would in a consumer-to-consumer transaction because used goods
are reserviced and expertly detailed by rent-to-own stores before the
next consumer's use.9 6
91. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
92. FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 51.
93. For instance, courts have found that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment
if inmates do not have mattresses. E.g., Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1449
(9th Cir. 1989); Anela v. Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir. 1986); Oladipupo v. Austin,
104 F. Supp. 2d 626 (W.D. La. 2000).
94. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6. For instance, Rent-A-Center rents Xbox 360s
and Portable Sony Playstations. Rent-A-Center, Gaming Systems, http://www6.
rentacenter.com/site/page/as29-pg4284.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
95. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32.
96. Telephone Interview with Robert Briley, Franchise Owner, Aaron Rents (May 18,
2007) [hereinafter Briley Interview] (on file with author); Korst Interview, supra note 9.
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The point is not that rent-to-own firms ought to be condemned for
offering luxury goods or that customers with lower incomes or
troubled credit histories should be criticized for wanting to enhance
the quality of their lives. It is important, however, to classify rent-
to-own merchandise in order to assess the policy rationales offered
for regulating rent-to-own transactions. Advocates of banning rent-
to-own altogether appear to rely implicitly on the argument that
poor people should be denied the choice to obtain expensive, high-
quality goods. Additionally, courts have assumed that rent-to-own
products constitute "the basic necessities of life,"97 so categorizing
these items as nonessentials has the potential to affect litigation
outcomes and shape judicial understandings of renting-to-own. 98
2. The Lack of Market Segmentation Among Consumers
With regard to pricing and contract terms, rent-to-own firms treat
the customers to whom they rent as a homogenous group. Unlike
other credit products, the cost and structure of the rent-to-own
transaction does not change if the consumer is rich or poor, has
good credit or bad credit, or intends to obtain ownership of the good
or just rent it for a week. This might seem like an unremarkable
feature of this transaction-most consumer goods are sold for the
same price, regardless of the customer's credit history or intentions.
In the realm of consumer credit, however, this lack of market
segmentation among different types of customers in the rent-to-own
business is extremely rare.
Consider, for instance, how credit card companies differentiate
among types of customers. Credit card companies charge different
interest rates for customers with different credit histories and
income levels.99 As technology has advanced, credit card firms have
been able to increasingly segment consumers based on the small
97. Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1264-65 (N.J. 2006).
98. Perez used the fact that rent-to-own goods are necessities to undermine the
compulsion rationale for treating loans of money differently from loans associated with sales
of durable goods. See id. at 1263-65.
99. See U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., THE EFFEcT OF INTEREST RATE CONTROLS IN
OTHER COUNTRIES 2.2(ix) (2004), available at http://microfinancegateway.com/files/
25620_file_Theeffect_of_interestratecontrols.pdf; see also KARGER, supra note 27, at 45.
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differences in risk each customer poses.0 0 This market segmenta-
tion has allowed credit card companies to price their cards much
more accurately. 10 ' In contrast, rent-to-own transactions occur on
the same terms and in the same way for all customers. Everyone
pays the same price; everyone gets the same services.
Despite this one-size-fits-all approach, rent-to-own customers
are heterogeneous in at least two important ways. The most obvious
is that different customers have different levels of risk.0 2 Some
customers pose significant risks to merchants, while others pose
little risk. Rent-to-own companies, unlike credit cards or mortgage
firms, do not run credit checks on potential consumers. 03
There is a more nuanced difference between customers: Some
customers rent goods for a short time, while others rent goods for
long enough to obtain ownership. The FTC Survey found that some
customers enter the transaction intending to obtain ownership,
some intend only to rent, and some are unsure.0 4 Remarkably,
customers' intentions at the outset of the transaction typically
match the actual outcomes from those transactions: 87 percent of
those who intended to purchase merchandise did so.'
Rent-to-own firms and the FTC have a sharp difference in opinion
about how many customers actually obtain ownership of rented
merchandise,0" but everyone agrees that rent-to-own customers fit
100. See MANN, supra note 49, at 40-41 (observing that the ability to use technology to
"aggregate and analyze accounts electronically, using statistical analysis to discern
creditworthiness" has led to "an ever-advancing differentiation of customers based on risk ...
into ever-smaller groups," which allows issuers to differentiate "prices into more and more
gradations, so that the price the lender offers each customer comes ever closer to a
hypothetical 'true' assessment of that customer's particular risk").
101. See id. at 146; Littwin, supra note 5, at 496.
102. See MANN, supra note 49, at 40-41.
103. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6; see also
CASKEY, supra note 27, at 50; Brooks, supra note 5, at 997. This is not to say that the rent-to-
own industry has no price discrimination. The industry discriminates by excluding some
people based on the requirements firms impose on renting, such as having a reliable source
of income and references. On the other end of the spectrum, the service itself excludes other
people who simply do not want to use it because they have cash to purchase the merchandise
outright or access to credit. Evidence suggests that people pick superior options when they
are available to them. See U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., supra note 99, 2.1(viii).
104. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 131 (noting that 67 percent rented intending to own, 25
percent rented intending to return the item, and 8 percent were unsure).
105. Id.
106. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 6 (reporting that 45 percent of agreements result
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into two distinct groups: those who end up purchasing the product
and those who only rent and never obtain ownership. Renting-to-
own is, thus, a misnomer for many customers who never intend to
own the products at all, but merely to rent. Rent-to-own firms
recognize the many reasons people might want only to rent, such as
trying out a product or using a product in a short-term living
arrangement. 107
The FTC Survey reveals that consumers who intend to obtain
ownership even have different characteristics than consumers who
rent and return the goods. McKernan, Lacko, and Hastak have
analyzed the FTC's data, comparing the two groups of customers,
and concluded:
The means of the explanatory variables hypothesized to affect
[rent-to-own] use and purchase differ by customer intent,
suggesting that customers intending to purchase differ substan-
tially from customers intending to temporarily rent. For
example, compared to customers intending to rent temporarily,
customers intending to purchase are less likely to own their
home (38% vs. 56%), more likely to have household incomes
below $25,000 (62% vs. 38%), and more likely to have less than
a high school diploma (39% vs 19%).... African Americans are
significantly more likely to use [rent-to-own] with the intent to
purchase than are Whites (68%), even after controlling for
income and education status.'
Yet, despite the existence of these two distinct, diverse segments,
the rent-to-own transaction treats all renters alike.
As subsequent sections will demonstrate, the lack of market seg-
mentation is not merely a matter of academic interest. For instance,
in ownership); Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 6 (reporting that 25 percent of
agreements result in ownership); Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 131 (reporting a 71 percent
purchase rate).
107. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 27. In
Australia, rent-to-own customers rent products for similar reasons. Try Before You Buy It with
Rent to Own, GoLD COAST SUN (Austl.), Jan. 24, 2007, at 68. In Canada, reports indicate
people use rent-to-own for seasonal work that requires relocation to a different city. Jeff
Korenko, Furniture for Rent; Many Newcomers to the Area Taking Advantage of Deals That
Offer Different Financing Options, DAILY HERALD-TRIB. (Grande Prairie, Alta.), Sept. 20, 2005,
at 4.
108. McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 43, 47 (internal citations omitted).
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courts have mistakenly assumed that all rent-to-own customers
intend to purchase the merchandise they rent.'0 9 Furthermore, a
lack of market segmentation can cause cross-subsidies in which one
segment of customers pays more than it should while another
segment pays less than it should. If poorer customers subsidize
richer customers, the cross-subsidy is regressive. The question of
exactly how the lack of market segmentation affects the justifica-
tions for regulating rent-to-own transactions is tackled in Part
II.A.4.
C. The Rent-to-Own Market
Having now looked at the transaction and the customers who
use it, this section examines how this $6.7 billion-a-year market
operates. ° The market is populated with two large, publicly held
firms and many smaller, independent operators, provoking the
policy question of whether regulators should encourage or prevent
large companies from dominating this market. In contrast to some
of the current literature, this Article argues that the market is
competitive. More significantly, it offers new evidence of how firms
compete for business, based on interview responses from industry
leaders. Defining which forces drive competition is significant from
a policy perspective. Regulation of terms over which firms do not
compete is easier to justify than regulation of terms that firms must
make attractive to compete for customers.
1. The Market Participants
Participants in the rent-to-own market can easily be categorized
into two basic groups: large, publicly held companies and small,
independent operators. The concentration in this market is pro-
nounced: There are only two publicly held firms, and these firms
make up 5,000 of the 8,300 rent-to-own stores across the country."'
109. The Perez court assumed that the consumer in that case entered the contract "in order
to become the owner of' the items. Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1258 (N.J.
2006).
110. APRO, Industry Overview, supra note 13.
111. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1.
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The biggest firm by far is Rent-A-Center. It has 3,406 stores,
which is approximately 41 percent of the market based on store
count."2 If its 282 franchised locations 1 3 are included in the count,
it controls 44 percent of the market." 4 Rent-A-Center has led the
consolidation movement in the industry, 1 5 consistently increasing
its market share. From the end of 2005 to the end of 2006, its
market share jumped from 33 percent 16 to 41 percent because Rent-
A-Center acquired Rainbow Rent-Way," 7 which had previously been
the third largest publicly held company."18
With almost two thousand fewer stores, Aaron Rents is the
second-largest player. Aaron Rents operates 1,286 stores in 47
states and Canada."9 Along with Rent-A-Center, Aaron Rents has
experienced significant growth: its total revenue has grown 20
percent over the past four years; its net earnings grew 30 percent; 20
and its stock rose 60 percent in 2003.121
Though both offer ownership through rental payments, these two
companies have some notable differences. Aaron Rents requires
112. Id.
113. Rent-A-Center's subsidiaries in the United States include Get It Now, LLC, operated
in Wisconsin, and ColorTyme, a national franchisor of rent-to-own stores. Id. at 27.
114. See id. at 9.
115. Rent-A-Center's consolidation is not the only evidence of aggressive acquisitions of
market share in the industry. Other rent-to-own firms, including Rent-Way before it was
acquired by Rent-A-Center, demonstrate the model of aggressive growth that characterizes
the largest players in this market. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 4 ("Our strategic
focus is on expanding our higher growth sales and lease ownership business through opening
new company-operated stores, expanding our franchise program, and making selective
acquisitions."); Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 1 ("Concurrent with the initial public
offering, the Company began implementing a strategy of aggressive store expansion driven
primarily by acquisitions and facilitated by the consolidation trend in the rent-to-own
market.").
116. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2006).
117. Even though Rent-Way no longer exists as an independent company, I use information
from its annual report in this Article as another-albeit imperfect--data point to understand
the industry.
118. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 3 ("On November 15, 2006, we completed the
acquisition of Rent-Way, Inc., which operated 782 stores in 34 states .....
119. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 4.
120. Id. ('Total revenues increased to $1.327 billion in 2006 from $640.7 million in 2002,
representing a 20.0% compound annual growth rate. Our total net earnings increased to $78.6
million in 2006 from $27.4 million in 2002, representing a 30.1% compound annual growth
rate. Total revenues for the year ended December 31, 2006 were $1.327 billion, an increase
of $201.1 million, or 17.9%, over 2005.").
121. KARGER, supra note 27, at 95.
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that customers make monthly payments, but Rent-A-Center is
flexible, allowing customers to choose between weekly or monthly
payments.122 Aaron Rents emphasizes that it is a leasing business,
not a rent-to-own business, claiming that it deals with higher-
income individuals, because affluent people are put off by the stigma
associated with rent-to-own. 23 In terms of the merchandise in its
stores, Rent-A-Center's business focuses almost singularly on
renting-to-own, but Aaron Rents sells more goods outright, manu-
factures some of the goods it rents itself, and has a business rental
division whose sole purpose is to rent items to meet short term
business needs. 24 Rent-A-Center, however, has expanded the
financial services it offers to customers. In 150 of its stores, Rent-A-
Center offers "short term secured and unsecured loans, debit cards,
check cashing and money transfer services."'25 This consolidation of
different fringe banking products into one provider is unique in the
fringe banking world, and Rent-A-Center's attempt to offer multiple
fringe products out of one store warrants further research.
The rest of the market is populated mostly by small independent
operators that are much more difficult to characterize than the
publicly held companies. Rent-A-Center asserts that, excluding it-
self and Aaron Rents, "the majority of the remainder of the industry
consists of operations with fewer than 20 stores.' ' 26 Small rent-to-
own stores open and close every day,'27 but some larger, established
chains boast over forty stores.1
28
One possible market participant conspicuously missing from this
list is retail stores. The most notorious "rent-to-own" case, Williams
122. Compare Korst Interview, supra note 9 (detailing Rent-A-Center's procedure), with
Briley Interview, supra note 96 (explaining Aaron Rents's procedure).
123. Briley Interview, supra note 96; Van Wagner Interview, supra note 64.
124. Briley Interview, supra note 96.
125. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 10 ("V~e offer financial services products, such
as short term secured and unsecured loans, debit cards, check cashing and money transfer
services under the trade name 'Cash AdvantEdge.' As of December 31, 2006, we offered some
or all of these financial services products in 150 Rent-A-Center store locations in 14 states.
We expect to offer such financial services products in approximately 350 to 400 Rent-A-Center
store locations by the end of 2007.").
126. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1.
127. Telephone Interview with Edward Winn, General Counsel, Ass'n of Progressive Rental
Orgs. (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter Winn Interview] (on file with author).
128. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
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v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., involved a traditional retailer, 129
and "traditional financial providers [such as Sears, which offers
financing,] are increasingly looking to nontraditional customers-
those with less-than-perfect credit records-as a growth area for
new business."'"3 Yet, retailers have almost completely abandoned
this market."'3 The most likely reason is that rent-to-own companies
have distinctive competencies relevant to rent-to-own customers.
32
This discussion provokes a key policy question: Is the market
better off because it is dominated by large, publicly held companies
that engage primarily in the fringe economy? This Article responds
to this question in Part III.A, which discusses how some regulations
drive the largest participants out of the market, leaving only small
operators offering this product.
2. Competition
This section addresses two questions: Is the rent-to-own market
competitive? If so, on what basis do rent-to-own firms compete for
customers? The best evidence suggests the market is competitive,
but the basis of that competition is different than one might
think-the contract terms and price do not seem to be the primary
drivers in the market.
Publicly held rent-to-own firms emphatically assert that the
industry is "highly competitive.' 33 These companies are likely right.
The industry is competitive because multiple rent-to-own stores are
129. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). As Douglas Baird points out, rent-to-own did not exist
at the time Walker-Thomas was decided. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH.
L. REv. 933, 951 (2006).
130. McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 33-34.
131. There is some evidence of traditional retailers entering the market and offering rent-
to-own services. Badcock & More, the United States's fourteenth-largest retail store operator,
has opened several rent-to-own stores near their traditional retail stores. 10 Questions for
Wogie Badcock, RTO MAG., July 2007, at 9. In Canada, a small, traditional furniture store
began offering rent-to-own goods because of the unique demand of a seasonal workforce in its
town. Korenko, supra note 107. A small group of Target stores also worked with a consumer
group to offer an alternative to rent-to-own as a way to "inform consumers about [rent-to-own]
exploitation"; the stores offered a limited credit card to people with poor or little credit
histories. Hill et al., supra note 27, at 8-9. Examples like these, however, are few and far
between.
132. See Hastak, supra note 28, at 94.
133. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 6; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 9.
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often placed in the same location,"' debunking the myth that con-
sumers use rent-to-own stores because they only have one choice.
For example, counting just the stores affiliated with the major trade
organization, Houston has sixty-five stores, Rochester has thirteen,
and New Haven has three.'35 Because almost all rent-to-own
customers have vehicles and can drive to find lower prices,13 all of
the stores in a metropolitan area put forth competitive force.
Additionally, one analyst has commented that "Rent-A-Center has
faced declining same-store sales, caused by stiffened competition in
the rent-to-own industry.'137
Potential competitors also exert competitive pressure on existing
rent-to-own firms. Rent-to-own firms believe that "[t]he cost of
entering the rental-purchase business is relatively low. ' 138 Larry
Sutton's rent-to-own business in Florida exemplifies the possibility
that small, independent operators can grow quickly in this industry.
Sutton rents tires and wheels in Tampa, and in just six years, his
revenue jumped from $10 million a year to $25 million a year, and
he added twenty stores to the fifteen he had six years earlier.
139
Rent-to-own firms also face competition from forces outside the
industry. To the extent that customers in the fringe economy have
access to other fringe products, rent-to-own stores compete with
credit card companies and other small loan providers. 4 ' Firms
compete most fiercely for customers who have better credit scores,
and they sometimes lose customers who "graduate" to other credit
134. See, e.g., Korenko, supra note 107; see also Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 8
("Many of our stores are placed near existing competitors' stores."); Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra
note 32, at 27 ("In addition, we strategically open or acquire stores near market areas served
by existing stores ('cannibahze) to enhance service levels, gain incremental sales and increase
market penetration. This planned cannibalization may negatively impact our same store
revenue and cause us to grow at a slower rate. There can be no assurance that we will open
any new rent-to-own stores in the future, or as to the number, location or profitability
thereof.").
135. To obtain this information, see the APRO's Rent-to-Own Store Search, http://login.
rtohq.org/source/Members/RentalMemberSearch.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
136. The extensive FTC Survey of rent-to-own customers found that 84 percent of
customers had a car or truck. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
137. Erick Bergquist, A New Contender Sets Sights on the Underbanked, AM. BANKER, Apr.
17, 2006, at 1.
138. Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 10.
139. Rodgers, supra note 51.
140. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 9 ("With respect to customers desiring to
purchase merchandise for cash or on credit, we also compete with retail stores.").
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products when their credit scores improve. 141 Rent-to-own firms also
compete to some extent with vendors that offer short term rentals,
like apartment owners who lease washers and dryers to tenants. 42
Finally, some rent-to-own stores, depending on their business
model, compete with retail stores.
43
Legal scholars in the past have asserted that the market is not
competitive. Martin and Huckins claim that rent-to-own stores are
located too far from each other to exert competitive force, that
customers lack access to credit cards, and that the industry is
increasingly experiencing consolidation.'1 The first argument is
plainly wrong. Not only do reports indicate that stores are close
together,45 but also almost all rent-to-own customers-84 percent
-have vehicles, so the distance between stores is not a barrier to
competition. 146
The other two arguments have some merit. Most customers do
use rent-to-own because they lack alternatives, although as the FTC
Survey describes, more customers have credit cards than we might
expect. 47 The mere fact that rent-to-own companies do not face
pressure from other forms of credit, however, does not entail that
the market is not competitive. There is internal competition among
rent-to-own firms and pressure from other industries. Moreover,
because there are less expensive alternatives in the market, rent-
to-own firms have to convince customers to pay the extra costs
associated with getting higher-quality merchandise.
141. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
142. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 18 ("We compete in the rent-to-rent market
with national and local companies and, to a lesser extent, with apartment owners who
purchase or provide furniture for rental to tenants.").
143. See Vail Interview, supra note 50 (explaining that his managers compete with retail
stores, and not other rent-to-own dealers, because his cash prices are competitive with retail
stores).
144. Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 405-06; see also Pimentel, supra note 12, at 394-95
(arguing that the rent-to-own industry is not competitive because rent-to-own customers lack
the resources to shop around for the best deals, forcing them to go to their local rent-to-own
store, and because consumers cannot obtain credit cards, insulating rent-to-own markets from
competitive pressure from credit card providers).
145. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
146. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 130; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
147. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 130 (reporting 44 percent of rent-to-own customers have
credit cards).
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The argument that consolidation has rendered the market
uncompetitive is appealing because of Rent-A-Center and Aaron
Rents's combined market share. 4 ' In 2006, however, the Federal
Trade Commission approved Rent-A-Center's acquisition of the
giant Rent-Way chain, indicating that under traditional antitrust
rules, at least, the market is competitive.
149
The mere fact that the rent-to-own market appears to be competi-
tive should not alone exempt it from regulation. Oren Bar-Gill has
argued that in the credit card market, for instance, the highly
competitive market encourages businesses to exploit consumer
irrationality. 50 Yet, in credit card markets as in other markets,
competition makes regulatory intervention on terms over which
firms compete much more difficult to justify.15'
Recognizing that the market is competitive, however, demands a
follow up question: How do firms compete for business? Past
scholarship has not addressed this question at all, but interviews
with market participants help fill in this critical gap. Both big and
smaller rent-to-own operators emphasized the importance of
personal relationships in building business.'52 Because almost all
customers pay in person, companies have an opportunity to either
gain or lose significant business through the relationships they
develop with customers.'53 Different stores also attract different
customers because of branding: Some people want small, community
operators as opposed to large corporate stores; 5 4 some people
148. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
149. But see Briley Interview, supra note 96 (explaining that he became an Aaron Rents
franchisee because Aaron Rents was moving to towns in which he had stores and he did not
want to suffer a loss of 25-30 percent of his business to Aaron Rents); Carrico Interview, supra
note 45 (reporting that breaking into a market that already has a Rent-A-Center store is very
difficult).
150. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1376 (2004)
("Interestingly, if the credit card market is indeed as competitive as it appears to be, issuers
have to exploit consumers' imperfect rationality in order to survive in this market." (emphasis
omitted)).
151. Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 269 (2006)
("[R]ecent evidence suggests that there is intense competition over interest rates in the credit
card market. Because such competition has been occurring, a governmental response does not
appear to be necessary or even desirable." (citations omitted)).
152. Carrico Interview, supra note 45; Korst Interview, supra note 9; Lewallen Interview,
supra note 50; Romine Interview, supra note 63.
153. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
154. Carrico Interview, supra note 45; Romine Interview, supra note 63.
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want to go to stores that "lease" instead of "rent" goods because of
a stigma associated with renting;155 and other people want stores
that are investing in the community.156 The quality and selection of
goods also drives competition, giving an advantage to companies
with more floor space. 157 Finally, operators report that rent-to-own
firms compete on the basis of price, though usually "price" means
the weekly or monthly costs of renting the goods, not the total
cost. 1
58
This small sampling of interviews is not definitive, and further
research would give regulators a more complete picture of how firms
compete. Still, it is worth noting what characteristics were not
mentioned by any operator. No one claimed that firms compete on
the basis of the costs of bundled fees, like insurance or preferred
customer programs, and no one suggested that operators seek to
attract customers by offering lower reinstatement fees or collection
fees. Even the price of the goods--often the most salient term of a
consumer deal159---did not make it onto some operators' lists.
Policymakers must regulate knowing that competition will not solve
market inefficiencies for these terms of the deal.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATION
Having parsed the relevant characteristics of the rent-to-own
business, this Part discusses possible justifications regulators might
offer for banning the transaction altogether, severely regulating it,
or regulating specific aspects of it. Though the case for a ban or
severe regulations is weak, there are strong justifications for
legislatures to enact narrow, tailored regulations. Customers are
prone to make some systematic mistakes using this product, so
regulators are justified in mitigating the effects of those mistakes
through tailored regulations.
155. See Briley Interview, supra note 96 (reporting that becoming an Aaron Rents franchise
owner attracted different customers from those who shopped when the stores were called Rent
City because customers were willing to be associated with leasing but not renting operations).
156. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
157. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
158. Briley Interview, supra note 96; Korst Interview, supra note 9.
159. Bar-Gill, supra note 54, at 45.
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A. The Case for Severe Regulations
First, this section takes up the question of whether policymakers
should ban this transaction or severely regulate it. It defines severe
regulations as those that will effectively ban the industry by
substantially decreasing the number of companies willing to do
business in jurisdictions adopting the regulations. Three of the
arguments in favor of severe regulations-the link to bankruptcy,
the high price to consumers, and the fact consumers lose eq-
uity-are, this Article concludes, nonstarters. A fourth argument,
the possible regressive cross-subsidy in this market, may provide
some ground for severe regulations. The final subsection of this Part
critiques banning the transaction by describing the costs of a ban to
consumers.
1. Bankruptcy
A sure foundation for regulating a transaction is the fact that the
transaction generates externalities,16 ° and the most obvious way
financial services create externalities is by pushing consumers
towards bankruptcy. If rent-to-own increases the likelihood that
consumers will file for bankruptcy, regulators have a basis for
severe regulatory intervention. However, the link between rent-to-
own transactions and bankruptcy is actually quite weak. Regulators
cannot use the externalities connected with bankruptcy to justify
regulations.
Proponents of regulations frequently cite increased rates of
consumers filing for bankruptcy as a reason to regulate a given
financial transaction. Ronald Mann has, for instance, demonstrated
that increased credit card debt leads to elevated levels of consumer
bankruptcy.16' The problem with this increase in filings, he urges,
is that financial distress imposes costs on third parties, such as
the debtor's family, the welfare safety net, and other creditors. 62 In
160. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL
STuD. 283, 284 (1995) (noting that courts enforce contracts that lack externalities but not
those that impose them).
161. MANN, supra note 49, at 67.
162. Id. at 49-50; see also John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer
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light of these costs, he contends that "those designing regulatory
policies for consumer credit markets and bankruptcy systems would
be well advised to account for the causative link between borrowing
and bankruptcy."'63
Though Mann's data present a credible link between credit card
debt and financial distress, the nature of the rent-to-own transac-
tion makes any link between rent-to-own and bankruptcy highly
suspect. The most relevant feature is, of course, the fact that the
consumer has no future obligation to continue making payments on
the contract and has taken on no debt. If a customer takes on rental
payments beyond his or her ability to pay, the contract is termi-
nated, and the goods are returned to the dealer. In this sense, the
rent-to-own transaction resembles the "fresh start" envisioned in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy: The debtor loses the goods but also has no
further obligation to pay creditors. The relationship between
renting-to-own and financial distress may be correlative in that
rent-to-own customers may be more likely to file for bankruptcy for
independent reasons, such as being overextended already. Or, it
is possible that customers take on additional debt to fulfill their
rent-to-own obligations, and this additional debt causes them to file
for bankruptcy. No one, however, has ever filed bankruptcy because
of an obligation to pay on a rent-to-own contract. Because renting-
to-own does not have a causative relationship with bankruptcy,
regulators must look elsewhere to justify banning the transaction.
The next sections evaluate other bases for pursuing regulation.
2. Price
The most popular and enduring criticism against the rent-to-own
industry is that consumers simply pay too much for the goods.
Typically, customers end up paying more than double the purchase
price of a product. When the total payments are conceptualized
as an implied APR, the APR is frequently above 200 percent.
Considered in tandem with the fact that most rent-to-own customers
Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 411 ("Few scholars today maintain that personal
bankruptcy is a fully isolated, internalized occurrence between a debtor and creditor alone.").
163. MANN, supra note 49, at 182; see also Pottow, supra note 162, at 412 n.34 (recognizing
that "the case for legal intervention is strengthened by the degree to which externalities
pervade").
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have low incomes, the high cost of obtaining goods invokes the
common notion that "the poor pay more."'64 Harold Karger neatly
sums up the point: "In the final analysis, the fringe economy preys
upon society's most vulnerable members by charging them more for
goods and financial services than it does the middle class, both in
absolute dollars and relative to their income.""16
Criticism based on high prices has come from a wide spectrum of
voices. Courts have sided against rent-to-own companies because
of the high prices charged;166 and even when ruling in their favor,
courts have vilified rent-to-own companies for high prices. 16
7
Academic criticism has overwhelmingly focused on consumers'
costs, 68 and some academics cite the high price of transactions in
the fringe credit economy as the only argument needed to support
regulation.'69 Consumer advocates rail against low-income custom-
ers paying more than the middle class, 7 ° and even the popular press
164. See generally DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-
INCOME FAMILUES (1967).
165. KARGER, supra note 27, at 198.
166. See Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding
unconscionable, without doubt, a contract "requiring [the customer] to pay over two and one-
half times the regular retail sales price of the television set for the extension of credit").
167. E.g., In re Pellegrino, 205 B.R. 479, 482 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) ("Rent-to-own
transactions are usually characterized by gross overcharging of customers.").
168. See, e.g., Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 413-14; McKernan et al., supra note 43,
at 35; Pimentel, supra note 12, at 370; Swagler & Wheeler, supra note 27, at 148; Walden,
supra note 34, at 336; Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-
Own Contracts: A Behavioral Economic Explanation, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 199, 200
(1999); see also Michael Hudson, Just a Few Bucks a Week: The Rent-to-Own Industry, in
MERCHANTS OF MISERY: How CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 145, 145 (Michael
Hudson ed., 1996) ("Rent-to-own customers routinely pay three, four, five times what they'd
spend on the same item at a retailer."); Thomas J. Methvin, Alabama's Poverty Industry, 58
ALA. LAW. 234, 239 (1997) ("A typical effective annual interest rate for many of these
transactions is 600 to 700 percent."); Nichols, supra note 28, at 354-55 (citing the benefits of
renting-to-own but condemning the "pricing structure [which] requires low-income customers
to pay anywhere from one and one-half to four times what a cash customer would pay for the
item").
169. Marketplace: The Other Subprime (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 28, 2007) (transcript
available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/03/28/theothersubprime/)
("Twenty years ago, if anyone said that people would be arguing that 360 percent small loans
were defensible ... I think people would think you were nuts." (quoting Kathleen Keest)).
170. See, e.g., FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 3 ('The primary criticism of the rent-to-own
industry by consumer advocates has concerned rent-to-own prices."); Martin & Huckins, supra
note 7, at 386 ("The primary complaint of consumer advocates against the industry is that
[rent-to-own] customers, many of whom are low-income, pay much more than if they
purchased the same goods in retail stores."); Allison Torres Burtka, N.J. High Court Restricts
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has joined this chorus of condemnation. 7 ' These criticisms are not
lost on rent-to-own consumers. Several studies report that high
prices are the main complaint customers have about their rent-to-
own experience. 17 2 Most importantly for the purposes of this Article,
regulators have latched on to the high price of renting-to-own as a
sole justification for regulating the industry.173
Though it may be intuitively revolting to make poor people pay
more for services than rich people, it is not entirely clear that the
price of a service alone can provide a justification for severely
regulating the service. Against the chorus of voices claiming price
alone justifies severe rent-to-own regulations, this Article argues
that price, by itself, cannot warrant severe regulation.
One problem with relying on high prices as the justification to
regulate the rent-to-own industry is that it leads to overly blunt
regulations. As Part I.B explained, the rent-to-own market is
unsegmented. All customers pay the same for a week or month's
rental, but not all customers use the product in the same way. If
regulators use price as the sole justification for severely regulating
rent-to-own companies, the regulations will necessarily cut out
sophisticated renters who intend to keep the goods for only a month
as well as unsophisticated renters who intend to acquire the goods
Interest in Rent-to-Own Contracts, TRIAL, June 2006, at 80 ("The urban poor should not be
charged 80 percent or 100 percent while the middle class only pays 20 percent at the mall."
(quoting Neil Fogarty, a consumer advocate from the Consumers League of New Jersey)).
171. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Economic View: TV's, DVD's: All Yours, But First Do the
Math, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at C4 ("Paying $2,000 for a $450 product is never a good
idea."); Opinion, Rent-to-Own Regulation Merits Support, WIS. STATE J., Aug. 7, 2005, at B3
(arguing that "consumers deserve to be protected by government regulation that caps the total
cost of rent-to-own agreements" because "the consumer ends up paying far more than the cash
purchase price").
172. See Hill et al., supra note 27, at 6 (reporting rent-to-own customers' complaints of high
prices); Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 133 (reporting that 27 percent of all rent-to-own
customers and two-thirds of dissatisfied customers whom the FTC surveyed complained about
price); Swagler & Wheeler, supra note 27, at 152 (reporting similar findings in a different
study).
173. Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 401 (describing the Attorney General of
Pennsylvania's testimony to Congress that rent-to-own transactions are objectionable simply
because of the high cost and effective interest rate); Joseph P. Fried, Rent-A-Center Charged
with Price Gouging, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at B8 (reporting that the New York
Department of Consumer Affairs objected to rent-to-own because "a survey of nearly half of
the 40 New York City outlets of the company, which has 2,400 stores nationwide, found that
the stores set base charges for TV's, DVD players, stereo systems and the like as high as triple
the manufacturers' suggested retail prices").
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over time. Both pay the same high prices, but regulators would
likely only intend to protect unsophisticated would-be purchasers,
and not sophisticated pure renters. 174 This is a classic example of
regulation that is not asymmetrically paternalistic. It stops the
beneficial use of a product by a party that is not suffering cognitive
failure. 1
75
High prices are also an insufficient foundation for regulation
because high prices-without correspondingly high profits--do not
necessarily indicate anti-consumer conditions. Some services are
very expensive, either because of the risks to the provider or
because of the costs of doing business in that industry. If rent-to-
own companies routinely posted above-market profits, regulators
would have good reason to regulate based on price alone. Evidence
from Rent-A-Center and Aaron Rents, however, indicates rent-to-
own companies actually post normal profits. 176 Last year Rent-A-
Center's operating profit as a percentage of total revenue was 9.1
percent; 7 7 Aaron Rents posted 5.9 percent in 2006.17' The regional
chain Rent One has drawn a 3 to 7 percent profit margin over the
last few years from its forty-four stores.179 As a point of comparison,
these profits are in line with Starbucks Corporation, which had a
7.2 percent profit margin last year.8 0 This normal profit margin
does not suggest that rent-to-own companies should not be regu-
lated; it just means that they should not be regulated purely on the
basis of price as academics, courts, consumer advocates, and the
press suggest.'8 '
174. The force of my argument is undercut by the fact that most rent-to-own customers do
have lower incomes, so the population of rich, sophisticated renters is relatively small. The
FTC found that 5.8 percent of people who used rent-to-own in the last year made over $50,000
a year and 10.4 percent of people who used it in the last five years made over that amount.
FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 42.
175. Camerer et al. explain that "[a] regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates
large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are
fully rational." Carerer et al., supra note 6, at 1212. Here, sophisticated short-term renters
are harmed by being denied a useful and needed product.
176. But see Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 416-17 (claiming rent-to-own firms have
higher operating profits than their retail counterparts).
177. Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 35.
178. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at exhibit 13.
179. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
180. Starbucks Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 31, 2007).
181. Cf. Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean
Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDRAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 204 (2007) ("[Dlespite the common
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Another way to understand why price alone is an insufficient
basis for regulation is to look at sources that suggest restricting
transactions based on high prices. When authors posit that transac-
tions should be regulated because of high costs, the true source of
the authors' suggestions is not really the high price of the items.
Instead, high prices serve as a proxy for some other underlying
problems-such as market failures or externalities. Ronald Mann
has unmasked this phenomenon as it relates to Elizabeth Warren's
and Eric Posner's justifications for usury restrictions:
Consider the social problems that motivate the proponents of
price controls. Posner worries about the external effects on the
welfare system of risky credit transactions. Warren is concerned
about high-priced borrowing that reflects poor judgment on the
part of those that engage in it. In neither case, however, is the
concern simply that the rate is too high. The idea in each case is
that high interest rates are a useful proxy for the types of
transactions that would justify market intervention." 2
Frank Darr's argument that courts should restrict pricey
transactions through the unconscionability doctrine provides an-
other example. 83 Darr asserts that courts should add price
unconscionability to the existing framework, consisting of substan-
tive and procedural unconscionability.' 4 Under his proposed
doctrine, courts would find a contract unconscionable only if "the
price [was] significantly different from a norm, measured by cost,
fair market value, or historic prices. ' Yet, even in this relatively
radical conception of unconscionability, Darr's real motive is not
merely restricting high prices. Instead, he wants to prevent market
failures. In addition to having a high price, a contract, under his
framework, would only be "price unconscionable" if (1) the contract-
belief, payday lending firms do not always make extraordinary profits. In fact, when compared
to many other well-known lending institutions, payday lenders may fall far short in terms of
profitability. If that is the case, then the call for regulation should be based solely in principle,
moral, or other subjective reasoning-not on high fees." (citations omitted)).
182. MANN, supra note 49, at 189.
183. See Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819
(1994).
184. Id. at 1840-41.
185. Id. at 1841.
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ing process was flawed and (2) the market does not provide for
private-enforcement measures.
186
The real problems Warren, Posner, and Darr hope to address are
distinct from price. Price is just a symptom. Alone, unaccompanied
by market failure or externalities, price is not a secure foundation
for regulating rent-to-own transactions. The next section addresses
one of the problems to which advocates of regulation may point to
demonstrate that price is symptomatic of a deeper concern: the
equity consumers forfeit in rent-to-own transactions.
3. Lost Equity
Policymakers may wish to prohibit rent-to-own transactions
because consumers lose all equity they have invested in the rented
asset if the agreement is terminated and the firm recovers the asset.
If part of the weekly payment a customer makes is attributed to
equity and not just the reasonable rental cost, then customers build
equity in the assets they are renting and risk forfeiting that equity
if their agreements are terminated.
In other commercial contexts, most notably mortgages, courts and
legislatures have, for centuries, effectively prohibited or restruc-
tured contracts that involve a borrower forfeiting the equity the
borrower has in an asset.'87 Before the seventeenth century, a land
owner who wished to borrow based on her land actually conveyed
the land to a mortgage lender who only had an obligation to return
it if the borrower repaid the debt in full.' If the borrower failed to
pay or paid late, the lender kept the land, and the borrower forfeited
her equity.189 Since the seventeenth century, however, courts have
employed the doctrine of the borrower's equity of redemption: A
borrower has the right to redeem real estate until the lender goes
through the official procedure of foreclosure19O-a procedure that
ensures the borrower receives any equity she has in the land. 9'
186. Id.
187. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 (1997).
188. Id. § 3.1 cmt. a.
189. See id.
190. Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive?: A Commentary and Critique on
Mortgage Law's Birth, Long Life, and Current Proposals for Its Demise, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 69, 69 (2003).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.4 (1997).
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More importantly, courts consistently strike down any contract
in which a borrower waives her rights and thereby forfeits the
equity-lenders cannot "clog" the borrower's equity of redemption.'92
Courts ferret out and reject creative attempts to clog borrowers'
equity of redemption'93 in order to protect impecunious, ignorant
landowners from exploitation by lenders.9 This right to redemption
and the rule forbidding contracts waiving this right has survived
even the massive deregulation of the consumer credit market
over the last twenty-five years that wore away other borrower
protections.'95 Additionally, bankruptcy laws'96 and the U.C.C.'97
reinforce the impetus to protect borrowers from forfeiting equity.
Regulators may extend this prohibition from real estate law to the
rent-to-own transaction. The rent-to-own transaction resembles
the pre-seventeenth century installment land loan because the
individual forfeits all equity if the contract terminates. If the loss of
equity is a fundamental, inseparable component of the rent-to-own
transaction, regulators may prohibit any rental purchase agreement
on the grounds that it clogs the customer's equity of redemption and
192. John C. Murray, Clogging Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279, 280 (1998).
193. For a survey of ways lenders have attempted to obviate the prohibition on clogging,
see generally id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 illus. 1-5 (1997).
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997); Dyal-Chand, supra
note 67, at 305. But see Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the
Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599 (1999) (suggesting "an alternative justification
for the equity of redemption, stressing the role of the law in fostering efficient renegotiation
upon default").
195. Dyal-Chand, supra note 67, at 315. The proposed Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act
also retains the provision that parties cannot contract around the statutory protections.
UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 104(a) (2002), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufbposa/2002act.pdf. ("Except as otherwise provided in subsections
(b) through (d), the parties to a security instrument may not by agreement vary the effect of
a provision of this [Act]."); see also Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming
Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1443 n.166 (2004)
(discussing § 104).
196. The automatic stay prevents foreclosures, thus protecting the consumer's equity. See
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership
Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 325 (explaining "chapter 13's on-the-books mortgage-protection
function: it not only stops a foreclosure, but also allows the filer to try to cure a mortgage
arrearage over a several year period").
197. See James E. Byrne, Contracting Out of the Uniform Commercial Code: Contracting
Out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 297, 323 (2006)
(discussing the 1952 version of § 9-501(3) and its official comment 4, which forbade consumers
from contracting out of the U.C.C.'s protection of equity, appealing to the prohibition on
clogging the equity of redemption).
2082
RENTING THE GOOD LIFE
strips away the equity the customer has invested into the rented
asset.
Regulators would be mistaken, however, to make this extension
and ban rent-to-own transactions. As a doctrinal matter, the equity
of redemption is inapplicable because under the definitions of
"credit sale" and 'lease" in Article 1 of the U.C.C., rent-to-own
transactions are not secured transactions.198 This answer, however,
does not address the policy issue of customers losing equity. For that
answer, one must look to how the rent-to-own business operates,
concluding that (1) most customers do not lose significant equity,
and (2) the loss of equity is not a fundamental, inseparable compo-
nent to this product because many rent-to-own businesses guaran-
tee customers a way to retain their equity. Thus, regulators should
not use lost equity to justify the prohibition of rent-to-own transac-
tions.
First, despite contrary assertions by some academics,199 most
customers do not lose equity when using a rent-to-own product.
Ninety percent of people who rent goods for longer than six months
obtain ownership of the goods,2"' so those people with the most
equity are the most unlikely to lose the equity they have acquired.
On the other hand, people who rent for a short time likely do not
acquire significant equity, and most probably acquire none. When
a customer rents a new product, the product immediately loses
value to the rent-to-own firm because used goods are much harder
to rent than new goods.20 1 Also, for someone renting for a short time,
the costs of delivering and picking up the merchandise-usually
paid for by the store-would be taken out of a smaller number of
payments, depleting any potential equity. For short-term renters,
these upfront costs most likely entail that their rental payments are
well below the reasonable rental costs. In summary, those custom-
ers that do have equity almost always retain it by acquiring
ownership, and those customers who do not acquire ownership most
likely do not have any equity built up to lose.
Second, consumers' lost equity is not a fundamental component
of this transaction-that is, the transaction can exist in a form that
198. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (2007) (defining leases).
199. See, e.g., KARGER, supra note 27.
200. FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 65.
201. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
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guarantees that consumers will not lose equity. The best evidence
of this claim is that many firms offer lifetime reinstatement rights:
Customers who have made rental payments but terminate their
agreements can reinstate their agreements at any time, picking up
with the same number of payments left to acquire ownership. The
market giants Rent-A-Center and Aaron Rents will both reinstate
any contract if the customer resumes making payments, even if
the customers allowed the contract to terminate months before. °2
A smaller, privately owned operator, Show-Me Rent-to-Own based
out of Farmington, Missouri, also allows reinstatement at any time,
even though Missouri's regulations only require reinstatement to
be allowed within three rental terms.20 3 Gary Romine, Show-Me's
owner, explained that his choice to provide lifetime reinstatement
rights was a business decision. His stores are more competitive in
the market because he can advertise that customers can always
continue terminated agreements. 2 4 Ernie Lewallen, the president
of a ten-store operation in Kentucky and Ohio, UHR Rents, Inc.,
explained that he offers lifetime reinstatement rights, despite the
fact that it hurts his bottom line in the specific transaction, because
it allows him to retain customers and prevents them from going to
the competition. 5 These examples demonstrate that regulators
do not need to ban the transaction entirely to prevent lost equity.
Instead, regulators who want to address this problem can do so
by mandating that firms offer lifetime reinstatement rights, as
discussed in Part III.C.
4. Rent-to-Own's Cross-subsidy
Part I.B explained that the rent-to-own market is not segmented
despite the fact that different types of customers rent goods for
different reasons-some to buy, and some to rent short-term. This
section tentatively argues that this lack of segmentation causes a
202. Id.; Telephone Interview with Customer Service Representative, Garden Oaks,
Houston, Texas Location of Aaron Rents (July 26, 2007) (on file with author).
203. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.664 (West 2001).
204. Romine Interview, supra note 63. Even operators that do not offer lifetime
reinstatement rights report that they work with customers to reinstate agreements if they
can. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
205. Lewallen Interview, supra note 50; see also Vail Interview, supra note 50 (explaining
that he offers lifetime reinstatement rights for the same reason).
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cross-subsidy in which poorer customers who actually purchase
merchandise subsidize relatively richer customers who only rent
short-term. If the cross-subsidy is regressive, as it appears to be,
regulators likely have an independent basis for severely regulating
this industry. Because, however, we lack data to answer this ques-
tion conclusively, the potential regressive cross-subsidy does not yet
offer a justification for a ban or severe regulations.
To understand the importance of the cross-subsidy in the rent-to-
own market, consider how some theorists argue it works with credit
cards. Significant research has attempted to demonstrate that credit
card usage results in a regressive cross-subsidy. People who do not
use credit cards at all pay more for goods than people who use credit
cards because merchants charge the same price for all goods
regardless of how a customer pays, but receiving payment by credit
card is more expensive for merchants than receiving payment by
cash.2 °6 Merchants bundle the extra costs associated with credit
cards into the goods themselves, thus increasing the price to all
consumers in order to pay for the fees that credit card issuers
charge the merchants.2 7 The result is a regressive cross-subsidy:
People who pay in cash tend to be the poorest Americans, whereas
credit card users are relatively better off.208 The rewards programs
that rich Americans benefit from "are funded in part by a highly
regressive, sub rosa subsidization of affluent credit consumers by
poor cash consumers. In its worst form, food stamp recipients are
subsidizing frequent flier miles."20 9 The subsidy is widely con-
demned because it is regressive, and commentary suggests it
provides a reason to intervene in credit card markets.210
Rent-to-own has the potential to have such a subsidy. Relatively
wealthy people tend to rent for only a short time period, whereas
206. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008).
207. Id. at 3.
208. The empirical data behind this point is subject to debate. More poor people are using
credit cards, see Littwin, supra note 5, whereas rich people are more prone to use debit cards
and check writing. This debate is outside the scope of this Article, so I do not address these
objections here.
209. Levitin, supra note 206, at 1.
210. See, e.g., id. at 51-52 (stating that a regressive subsidy warrants regulatory
intervention even if regulators cannot weigh the net effects of credit card use).
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relatively poor people tend to rent in order to acquire ownership.211
These two groups pay the same amount per week even though some
rent for a short time and end up with nothing from the transaction,
and others rent for a very long time, ending up with the goods but
also a significant total cost over time.
There is no empirical evidence about whether rent-to-own firms
make more money from those who rent for a long or a short time or
about how they redistribute the extra costs associated with the less
profitable segment. Thus, we do not know which group is subsidiz-
ing the other. Interviews I conducted with industry participants,
however, suggest that people who eventually purchase merchandise
subsidize short-term renters.
The re-rent or resale value of used goods is quite low because
customers would rather rent new goods than old goods,212 so the
short-term renter costs rent-to-own firms money by decreasing the
value of the goods by converting them into used goods-just like a
car loses $5,000 of its value the minute it is driven off the lot. Also,
short-term renters impose more costs on firms than long-term
renters because the rent-to-own company has to pay the costs of
delivering the merchandise and picking it up from the customer's
house.213 If a customer's few rental payments are less than the value
lost in the conversion from new goods to used goods and the cost of
delivery and pick up, rent-to-own stores potentially could lose
money from short-term renters. Some operators admit this is the
case,214 and one interviewee went so far as to say that his firm
makes no money if a customer only rents merchandise for four
211. McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 52.
212. See Carrico Interview, supra note 45; Korst Interview, supra note 9. Against this view,
one participant indicated that rent-to-own firms make the most money from customers who
rent goods for a significant time period and then return the goods. Van Wagner Interview,
supra note 64. In these cases, the firm can then re-rent the same goods, which look new when
they are thoroughly detailed, for another extended period of time to a new customer. Id.
Because, however, the FrC's evidence demonstrates that most people who return goods do so
after a short period of time, there are probably few instances of long rentals being returned,
so the chances to make more profits this way are probably quite limited.
213. See Vail Interview, supra note 50.
214. See Lewallen Interview, supra note 50 (noting that if people pay until the end of the
agreement, these customers would be more profitable, but contending that few people do so);
Vail Interview, supra note 50 (asserting without qualification that long-term purchasers are
more profitable).
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months or less and returns it. 215 It appears, then, that long-term
renters subsidize short-term renters. If so, the poor person attempt-
ing to obtain ownership of a washing machine may be making it less
expensive for the rich person to rent a big-screen TV to watch the
Super Bowl.
Despite this initial investigation into the question, more empirical
studies are needed to understand how rent-to-own firms reconcile
the costs and benefits derived from the two types of people who use
the product. To determine that people paying cash subsidize credit
card users, Levitin examined several empirical studies that tracked
prices of retail gasoline when gas stations offered cash discounts.216
Without empirical data like this for the rent-to-own industry,
regulators are left without clear evidence that the poor pay more
through many payments over time because short-term renters
are less profitable for rent-to-own firms. Though this potential
regressive cross-subsidy provides the best argument for severe
regulations, regulators are on very shaky ground justifying such
regulations without more evidence about exactly how these two
segments of the rent-to-own market interact.
5. The Case Against Severe Regulations: The Problems of
Unsatisfied Demand and Relative Inefficiency
The previous four subsections contend that the case for severely
regulating the rent-to-own market is weak. This subsection extends
that argument by demonstrating the costs of eliminating the rent-
to-own transaction. Eliminating the option for consumers to rent-
to-own will either leave consumer demand for durable goods
unsatisfied or it will force consumers towards inferior, more costly
alternatives.
It has been well documented that demand for consumer credit is
constant. The United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry
conducted an expansive study of consumer borrowing in the United
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and France.2" These four
countries have different restraints on the availability of credit, but
215. Vail Interview, supra note 50.
216. Levitin, supra note 206, at 30.
217. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., supra note 99.
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the demand for credit appeared to be independent of the availability
of credit.218 The study found that the most deeply felt impact of
state-imposed restrictions on consumers' ability to obtain credit was
an inability to make major purchases, 19 indicating that much of the
constant demand for credit is really a demand for major purchases,
such as purchases of durable goods.
Rent-to-own satisfies the need to obtain durable goods without
purchasing them outright. The question regulators must address is
what consumers will do if severe regulations eliminate renting-to-
own as mechanism for meeting the constant demand for obtaining
durable goods without paying cash for them. The answer, I think, is
that some customers will not obtain the demanded goods, and others
will use less efficient acquisition vehicles.
Rent-to-own is often the only option available to the consumers
that use it.220 Rent-to-own companies report that people turn to
them because they do not have other options."' Empirical research
substantiates this claim.222 Hill et al. summarize their findings on
this issue: "[C] ustomers' willingness to pay originally or continue to
pay the higher prices charged by [rent-to-own] retailers is not a
function of relative desire but of relative constraint.""22 Consumers
turn to rent-to-own because they cannot qualify for credit;224 because
they have erratic income and want to acquire goods without a long-
218. See id. 2.1(i); see also MANN, supra note 49, at 109 (demonstrating that demand for
credit is a function of economic growth by comparing borrowing in Japan and the United
States); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 6, at 1497 (explaining Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew
Weiss's theoretical argument that high-risk borrowers' demand for credit is inelastic).
219. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., supra note 99, 2.1(iv).
220. For a short history of why rent-to-own firms became the only source of financing
durable goods, see Nehf, supra note 12, at 753-55.
221. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 4; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1.
222. E.g., CASKEY, supra note 27, at 19; U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., supra note 99,
2. 1(ix).
223. Hill et al., supra note 27, at 7.
224. McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 51. Swagler and Wheeler found that 59 percent of
rent-to-own users surveyed had been denied credit. Swagler & Wheeler, supra note 27, at 150
tbl.3; see also id. at 153 ("The most notable difference had to do with the denial of credit;
among repeat users, 70.8 percent reported having been denied credit, as compared with only
51.4 percent of those who had participated just once."). But see Zikmund-Fisher & Parker,
supra note 168, at 213 ("In particular, present access to credit cards is completely non-
predictive of [whether someone is willing to recommend rent-to-own], indicating that at least
some consumers would choose to use rental-purchase even given access to revolving credit
accounts.").
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term commitment;225 or because they are unbanked and must make
cash payments.226 The fact that so many people use rent-to-own
because they do not have other options entails that if regulators
eliminate this transaction, those people will go without these
goods.227
Wisconsin provides a real-world example of the theoretical
argument I have sketched above. In Wisconsin, the state attorney
general sued Rent-A-Center for violating consumer protection
laws.22" As part of the settlement agreement in the case, Rent-A-
Center agreed to disclose APR information to consumers. 29 Directly
because of this settlement, Rent-A-Center stopped offering rent-
to-own products and instead offered pure sales and traditional credit
in Wisconsin.3 ° Manoj Hastak developed an analytical framework
for analyzing the effect of the settlement and the changed business
model.23' He postulated that if Rent-A-Center was no longer serving
the same customers, the most needy consumers would be worse
off from this settlement.232 The information I gathered from an
interview with Rent-A-Center reveals that, in fact, Rent-A-Center
is not serving the same customers.233 Though the "best" customers
continued to use Rent-A-Center's revamped product, those custom-
ers with troubled credit histories were left out.2" 4
For some customers, rent-to-own is not the only alternative, but
it is often the best option. Consider the following alternatives to
using rent-to-own products to obtain goods over time:
225. See Anderson & Jackson, A Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 300.
226. See id. ("The alternative of using cash payments with [rent-to-own] is vital to the 23
percent of its users who are unbanked with no access to a credit card, checking account, or
savings account." (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).
227. For the argument that usury laws restrict consumers' access to credit cards, see Mark
Furletti, Comment, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts
To Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 451 (2004).
228. Hastak, supra note 28, at 89.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 93-94.
233. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
234. Id.
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Layaway: Layaway, to the extent it is available at all,235 is both
costly and disadvantageous. Under a K-Mart plan that was studied,
"[t]he APR for a layaway on a portable television with a retail price
of $152 is 57.1 percent.'" 236 Though this APR is lower than the
implied APR of many rent-to-own transactions, customers using
layaway (1) do not obtain the right to use the goods immediately; (2)
must pay the total price in a shorter time period than rent-to-own;
(3) often must pay a large deposit; and (4) often are unprotected by
any consumer protection statutes. 237 Given these constraints,
layaway is a poor substitute.
Credit Cards: Credit cards with APRs closer to 20 percent appear
to be a less expensive alternative than rent-to-own.238 Certainly,
they can be. If a customer with a credit card with a 20 percent APR
charges $450 to purchase a television from Best Buy, however, it
will take the customer eighty-one months to pay off the debt if the
customer makes the minimum payment, assuming that payment is
2.5 percent of the total debt.239 The interest charged over those
eighty-one months would be $364.60, bringing the total cost of the
television to $814.60.24o Paying with a credit card would approxi-
mate the cost of acquiring the television from a rent-to-own dealer,
but the consumer would take around four and a half times the
length of time to pay off the debt. Moreover, for the customers who
use rent-to-own because of impaired credit, the credit card interest
rate will be much higher than the generous 20 percent assumed in
this example.
235. See Alyson Ward, Layaway, R.I.P., FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 3, 2007, at F1
(reporting that Wal-Mart has stopped offering layaway).
236. Anderson & Jackson, A Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 299.
237. See generally Johnson, supra note 83, at 1259-62.
238. Christopher Korst suggested this comparison to me. See Korst Interview, supra note
9.
239. Of course, the customer does not have to make the minimum payment, and if a
customer paid the same weekly payments towards a credit card bill that a rent-to-own
contract would require, the customer would end up paying much less. In the general
population, around 7 percent of customers make only minimum payments. Julia Lane, Note,
Will Credit Cardholders Default over Minimum Payment Hikes?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
331, 334 (2006). Among potential rent-to-own customers, however, I suspect the number is
much higher.
240. To perform this calculation, see Bankrate.com Credit Card Calculator, The True Cost
of Paying the Minimum, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/calclMinPayment.asp (last visited
Mar. 31, 2008).
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Payday Loans: Taking out a payday loan to purchase a $450
television over seventy-eight weeks would cost a customer around
$2,205,241 more than double the cost of obtaining the television
through renting-to-own.242
These three examples are not meant to be exhaustive but merely
to point to the reality that the typical rent-to-own customer often
will have less desirable options if regulators ban rent-to-own
transactions.
The force of this argument is certainly diminished because rent-
to-own goods are not essentials but instead enhance the quality of
people's lives. 243 The demand for rent-to-own is not inelastic, and the
social welfare harm from regulators eliminating this industry is less
significant because the goods are not necessities. Still, although the
harm is less significant than the harm of eliminating access to all
credit, it exists nonetheless. Because of this harm, policymakers
wanting to ban the rent-to-own market must show benefits that
outweigh the harm.
These benefits, however, cannot be established. Research has not
demonstrated a link to financial distress and the corresponding
negative externalities, consumers do not typically lose equity, and
the high price of the goods-without more-has proven insufficient
to justify severe restrictions. The best case for restrictive regulation
is the potential regressive cross-subsidy in the market, but this
justification still requires further study to establish it conclusively.
At the end of the analysis, the case for a ban or severe regulation is
very weak.
B. The Case for Narrow, Tailored Regulations: Paternalism
Because severe regulation cannot be justified, this section
examines the best argument for less burdensome regulations. I
conclude that paternalism provides a justification for some restric-
tions because, as behavioral law and economics has revealed,
241. $45 (the $10 per $100 lent fee charged every pay cycle) X 39 weeks (assuming a two-
week pay period) + $450 (the amount required to pay off the initial loan) = $2,205.
242. It is more likely that the loan amount will decrease over time because the customer
would pay down some of the principal with each fee payment. Still, the cost of acquiring
durable goods through payday loans is much greater than through rent-to-own.
243. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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customers are prone to make systematic mistakes. Though these
consumer weaknesses justify narrow regulatory intervention, they
do not justify banning the industry entirely.
Behavioral law and economics challenges the standard economic
model of consumers as fully rational decision makers.244 Instead of
seeing people as utility-maximizing machines, behavioral law and
economics recognizes the reality that people are plagued with
cognitive failures that sometimes prevent them from making
choices in their own best interests. For example, some people
sacrifice future happiness for instant gratification, others discount
the risk that they will suffer economic adversity in the future, and
so on. 245 In competitive markets, it is argued, businesses will
capitalize on consumers' sub-optimal decision making.2 46 To the
extent that businesses exploit consumers' cognitive failures,
behavioral law and economics suggests that regulators may use
paternalistic concerns to justify regulations that force or steer
consumers to make decisions that benefit them.247 Such regulations
244. Full rationality usually means that "people have well-defined preferences" that they
maximize; that these "preferences accurately reflect ... the true costs and benefits of the
available options"; and that "in situations that involve uncertainty, people have well-formed
beliefs about how uncertainty will resolve itself." Camerer et al., supra note 6, at 1214-15.
245. Id. at 1217-18. Behavioral law and economics has produced a prodigious amount of
literature. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 424 (2005); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1747 (1998).
246. Bar-Gill, supra note 150, at 1373 ("Absent legal intervention, the sophisticated seller
will often exploit the consumer's behavioral biases. The contract itself, commonly designed
by the seller, will be shaped around consumers' systematic deviations from perfect
rationality."); Sunstein, supra note 151, at 254 ("It is even plausible to suggest that market
pressures will lead companies to appeal to the human tendency, grounded in the factors just
outlined, to borrow excessively.").
247. Bar-Gill, supra note 150, at 1377 (arguing that the underestimation bias generates
welfare costs because it distorts competition in the credit card market, causes prices to
deviate from marginal costs, and gives rise to a troubling distributive effect through
transactors being cross-subsidized by borrowers); Camerer et al., supra note 6, at 1218 ("It is
such errors-apparent violations of rationality-that can justify the need for paternalistic
policies to help people make better decisions and come closer to behaving in their own best
interest."); Pottow, supra note 162, at 455 ("If the premise of a cognitive bias is that a
consumer, due to underestimation or myopia or some other psychological impediment, is
unable to say what she truly wants in terms of credit, then the state's putting certain items,
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are justified even if the transaction has no effect whatsoever on
third parties.24
The traditional cognitive limitations that behavioral law and
economics uses to justify paternalistic regulations are not as
pronounced in the rent-to-own market as one might expect. Though
rent-to-own customers likely suffer from some cognitive failures,
the proper regulatory response, this section argues, is to limit
specific aspects of the transaction, not to ban or severely limit the
transaction as a whole. To the extent that paternalism motivates
proponents of severe rent-to-own regulations, it appears to be an
extremely aggressive form of paternalism that robustly seeks to
hinder consumer preferences and choices-it does not fit the mode
of the weak paternalism advocated by behavioral economists.
The following sections analyze several relevant cognitive failures
that might affect customers in the rent-to-own market and may
justify regulation.
1. The Optimism Bias
Behavioral economists contend that some customers suffer from
excessive optimism when using products that require payments over
an extended period of time, much like young smokers who falsely
think they will probably quit smoking in the future.249 In the context
of credit cards, for instance, consumers are excessively optimistic
about how much money they will make in the future and how much
like unaffordable credit, off limits should be acceptable."); id. at 457 ("Indeed, the problem of
the sweatbox lending model that exploits the cognitive defects of certain borrowers is an
independent ground for policy intervention wholly apart from any trouble with
externalities."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and
Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 207, 224 (2006) ("The most common use of cognitive
psychology in legal scholarship is to support paternalistic legal interventions.).
248. See Kristin Siegesmund & Leah Weaver, Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N: A Model
for Substantive Consumer Protection, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223, 226 (2006) (positing in
the context of mortgages that "when the impetus to make a rational decision is removed from
one side of the equation," regulators must act to ensure the market operates correctly); Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) ('The paternalistic aspect consists in the claim that it is legitimate for
private and public institutions to attempt to influence people's behavior even when third-
party effects are absent. In other words, we argue for self-conscious efforts, by private and
public institutions, to steer people's choices in directions that will improve the choosers' own
welfare.").
249. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 6, at 1540-41; Sunstein, supra note 151, at 252.
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they will have to pay to cover expenses; they underestimate their
future need for credit; and they underestimate the likelihood that
unforeseen misfortune will disrupt their income or ability to pay
expenses.25°
In the rent-to-own market, the optimism bias has the potential to
show up when consumers begin a transaction intending to acquire
the good. Severe regulations might be justified to alleviate this bias
since a majority of consumers intend to purchase the goods.25' Due
to the optimism bias, consumers would overestimate the likelihood
that they will be able to complete the payments required for
ownership. Hoping to acquire goods, people may make a substantial
number of payments towards ownership but end up having to return
the goods before the contract is up because some negative turn of
events that they should have anticipated prevents them from
completing the contract. Based on the optimism bias, we might
expect that a significant number of people fall into this category.
We would be wrong. The best empirical evidence indicates the
exact opposite. Rent-to-own customers are remarkably accurate in
their predictions of whether they will obtain ownership. The FTC
Survey found that of the customers who entered the rent-to-own
transaction intending to purchase the goods, 86.6 percent of
customers actually acquired ownership. 2 In contrast, only 10.1
percent of people intending only to rent obtained the goods.25' Even
more remarkably, only 8 percent of rent-to-own customers who
returned merchandise did so because they could no longer afford the
payments or had other expenses, meaning that only 2.4 percent of
all rent-to-own customers returned merchandise because they faced
liquidity problems.5 4 Given this small percentage, the claim that
250. See Bar-Gill, supra note 150, at 1400; Levitin, supra note 206, at 45-46; see also Block-
Lieb & Janger, supra note 6, at 1541 ("Potential borrowers are more likely to underestimate
than overestimate the risks associated with uncertainty, particularly when they believe
themselves to have control over these events."); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of
Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 736 (2005) (noting studies demonstrating that
"people tend to overestimate the probability of compound events," such as, in this case,
multiple rent-to-own payments over a 78-week contract).
251. See Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 131 (reporting that 67 percent of customers rent in
order to own).
252. See FTC SURVEY, supra note 31, at 68 tbl.5.4.
253. See id.
254. Id. at 62-63 & n.100. Five percent of those who returned merchandise did so because
of "changed circumstances, such as a move, divorce, or death in the family." Id. at 62. Because
2094 [Vol. 49:2041
20081 RENTING THE GOOD LIFE 2095
rent-to-own customers overestimate their future ability to complete
the contract lacks merit.2 5
Instead of being overly optimistic, customers use rent-to-own
transactions precisely to address the risk of future contingencies.
Another survey, conducted by economists Zikmund-Fisher and
Parker, found that consumers choose rent-to-own because they are
aware of risks of future losses of income: "Households are more
likely to rent-to-own when they face uncertain or unstable levels of
disposable income." '256 The ability to walk away from the transaction
if their finances go south is very valuable to customers because
they can terminate the contract with no future damages to their
credit and no risk that their creditors could seize their other assets
to satisfy the debt.257 Instead of demonstrating a propensity to
underestimate future liquidity problems, rent-to-own customers use
the product precisely because they have a risk-averse preference.258
Far from being a justification for severe regulation, the optimism
bias in this context supports permitting the rent-to-own industry to
operate.
these unexpected events are not fundamentally financial, I do not think they implicate the
optimism bias.
255. Rent-to-own customers may underestimate ex ante the probability they will need to
reinstate the agreement. See Bar-Gill, supra note 150, at 1433 (making this argument in the
credit card context). If so, the case for mandatory reinstatement agreements is strong, see Part
III.C, because customers will undervalue but actually require this contractual provision.
256. Zikmund-Fisher & Parker, supra note 168, at 214.
257. See McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 37 (reporting the FTC's finding that "consumers
value the option to terminate the agreement at any time without further financial liability or
damage to their credit rating").
258. Zikmund-Fisher & Parker, supra note 168, at 214. Zikmund-Fisher and Parker also
found that hyperbolic discounting does not account for rent-to-own usage. See id. at 209-11.
Hyperbolic discounting refers to the phenomenon that people "exhibit higher rates of discount
between time periods the closer those periods are to the present." Whitman & Rizzo, supra
note 41, at 10. The best evidence suggests people do not rent-to-own because of inter-temporal
discount rates. In Zikmund-Fisher and Parker's study, "most subjects demonstrated a strong
preference for shorter contracts," indicating they did not want to defer payments because of
hyperbolic discounting. Zikmund-Fisher & Parker, supra note 168, at 210. But see Swagler
& Wheeler, supra note 27, at 156 (arguing that rent-to-own consumers value the ability to
cancel rental purchase agreements and return the goods because of "a short term horizon (or
high rate of discount)").
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2. The Anchoring Effect and Framing
Behaviorists suggest, and Madison Avenue powerfully demon-
strates, that consumers are affected by how a seller presents the
terms of a deal. The anchoring effect refers to the fact that "individ-
uals tend to focus on an obvious or convenient number or event;
although individuals adjust their perceptions upward or downward,
they continue to skew their estimates toward the anchor."2"9 The
anchoring effect causes consumers evaluating whether to borrow
money to look only at whether they can afford the monthly
payment.6 ° Focusing on that one aspect of the transaction causes
consumers to ignore the total cost of the transaction and renders
APRs virtually meaningless.2"'
The anchoring effect works in conjunction with sellers framing
the transactions for the buyers. Sellers can exploit consumers'
tendencies to anchor by framing decisions in such a way as to elicit
irrational behavior. Patricia McCoy precisely quips: "Predatory
lenders make attractive terms salient and obscure terms that might
pose concern. 262
Anchoring and framing operate in the rent-to-own industry,
according to industry participants, when people latch on to-and
companies promote-the weekly or monthly payments, not the
overall cost or the implied APR associated with acquiring goods over
time. 26 If rent-to-own customers do not consider the total cost, they
will not be able to weigh whether to purchase the goods outright
using savings or to rent the goods until they acquire the title. Also,
if they do not calculate or appreciate the implied APR, they will not
be able to compare renting-to-own to obtaining the goods using
credit.
Instead of seeing the decision to frame the rental agreement in
terms of fixed payments as exploitive and justifying severe regula-
tion, however, I assert that framing the transaction in periodic
payments in real dollar amounts benefits customers. Because people
259. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 6, at 1533.
260. See id. at 1539.
261. Id.
262. McCoy, supra note 250, at 737.
263. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (stating that rent-to-own firms report
that they compete on the basis of price per week or month, not total cost).
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have a predisposition to make decisions based on fixed periodic
amounts and not relatively abstract APRs, the fact that rent-to-own
companies present the terms of the contract in fixed dollars leads to
a more transparent, relevant disclosure regime than many legally
mandated regimes that focus on APRs.
To appreciate this point, consider the credit card customer. With
credit cards, customers are told the card's APR-though often it is
obscured through an introductory teaser rate offer.2 Evidence
shows, however, that American consumers cannot understand basic
arithmetic and financial terms,26' and even if they could, they
cannot calculate the effective interest rate-that is, the rate that
includes the stated APR plus the cost of additional fees.266 Yet,
people do understand a credit card's finance charge because this fee
is represented in dollars, not as a percentage.267
To combat consumers' inability to perceive and understand credit
card functionality, Angela Littwin has proposed an entirely fixed-fee
credit card product. She describes how it would operate:
[T]he credit card company would determine the ratio of interest
and fees to principal ahead of time and convey this information
to the consumer when it issued the card. For example, for a
$1,000 credit card, the credit card company would specify that,
say, $600 of this $1,000 was interest and fees and $400 of it was
the actual limit on the amount the consumer could spend. The
$600 would represent the entire amount of interest and fees to
be charged over the life of the loan.268
One of the chief benefits of such a fixed-fee card is that it allows
consumers to understand the real cost of the loan by making "the
financial terms of credit cards much less complicated and less-
en[ing] the misunderstandings associated with how credit cards
work. 2 69 Also, a fixed-rate credit card "would force consumers to
264. See Littwin, supra note 5, at 496.
265. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 6, at 1538.
266. See Littwin, supra note 5, at 496.
267. See Diane HeUwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing: Why Re-
Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567,
1591-93 (2005).
268. Littwin, supra note 5, at 493.
269. Id. at 45.
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internalize psychologically these costs earlier in the decision-making
process."27
This proposed improved credit card looks and acts almost exactly
like the current rent-to-own transaction. The costs are explained to
the customer in fixed dollar amounts, not APRs, so customers can
understand the terms, and the customer knows upfront the entire
cost of the transaction. Moreover, by making customers pay the
same weekly or monthly rate during the entire contract, renting-to-
own forces customers to internalize the costs immediately, unlike
traditional credit cards that offer a gap between the customer's
purchase and actual payment. By reformulating the credit card
product to fit the way consumers actually behave, Littwin has
demonstrated how the rent-to-own transaction operates in a way
that makes sense to customers, does not obfuscate the terms most
relevant to them, and forces them to internalize the costs of their
conduct upfront.27'
This Article has argued that framing is relatively benign and does
not warrant banning the industry. Still, the anchoring effect and
framing have a strong potential to cause irrational consumer
decision making with regards to bundled fees and behavior-driven
fees. Because consumers make decisions only with the weekly price
in mind, they neglect to appreciate the additional costs when a
dealer tries to sell them insurance or a membership in a preferred
customer club. Also, despite the fact that late fees can drastically
increase the actual costs of ownership if the customer misses some
payments, customers, focused on the weekly payment, skew the
estimated costs of ownership toward that weekly payment amount
instead of calculating the weekly payment amount plus the
estimated number of extra fees.
3. Procrastination
Cass Sunstein explains the role procrastination plays in consumer
markets:
270. Id.
271. For another example of a reform that brings a credit product away from an APR-
dominated disclosure regime to a fixed-fee model, see Mann & Hawkins, supra note 5, at 903-
04 (suggesting that regulators require payday lenders to post a fixed fee to represent the cost
of a payday loan instead of posting an APR).
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For many borrowers, it is not difficult to avoid high interest
rates and late charges. Timely payments will eliminate the
problem. But some borrowers procrastinate, ensuring that some
bills are paid late. As a result, significant charges can accumu-
late. It is apparently difficult for some people to overcome the
costs of inertia even when transaction costs are minuscule; I
speculate that the economic level of late fees is, in nontrivial
part, a result of procrastination. 272
Procrastination's role in the rent-to-own market likely works just as
Sustein postulates. People pay late fees, reinstatement fees, and
other behavior-driven fees because they put off paying their weekly
or monthly payment. Though this is hardly a reason to ban the
transaction entirely, regulators should consider how the rent-to-
own transaction may foment this behavior. Because most contracts
require payment every single week, customers have roughly four
times the potential to incur late fees as the typical credit card user
who pays on a monthly basis. Also, the costs of procrastination are
more significant for rent-to-own users. If a credit card customer
fails to pay a credit card bill, late fees and interest are the only
repercussions, but a rent-to-own firm may repossess the goods of a
delinquent customer.
4. Self-control, Miswanting, and Cumulative Cost Neglect
I group three frailties-self-control, miswanting, and cumulative
cost neglect-because they likely relate to the same aspect of the
rent-to-own transaction. Behavioral economists posit that people
lack self-control and therefore make decisions that undermine
their long-term welfare, like spending when they should be saving
or eating Twinkies when they should be eating leafy green vegeta-
bles.273 Further, people may suffer from miswanting. They desire
goods that will not actually enhance their well-being, and they do
not desire goods that will provide a higher quality of life." 4 Finally,
consumers are prone to cumulative cost neglect in that they will
272. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 251-52.
273. Id. at 252.
274. Id. at 253.
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make many small borrowing decisions without realizing that the
aggregate amount of the borrowing is very high.2 5 Though someone
may refuse to take out a loan for $20,000 because the amount is too
high, that same person will take out numerous small loans that all
total to $20,000 because the consumer neglects the cumulative
costs.
2 7 6
In the rent-to-own market, these three behaviors most likely
cause sub-optimal decision making when consumers decide whether
to rent merchandise at all and whether to rent more than one item.
In terms of the initial decision to rent one item, some consumers
would be better off saving the weekly payments they make to their
rent-to-own store and buying the item at a much lower total cost
after saving a sufficient amount. Because of problems with self-
control, however, they rent the item immediately. Other customers
rent the wrong goods because of miswanting. They start renting a
plasma television or jewelry when really they should rent a bed or
obtain an inferior product from a second-hand store or a charity.
These two forces act in the same way when consumers decide to
rent a second item, but in addition, customers have the potential to
suffer from cumulative cost neglect. Perhaps a customer initially
deciding to rent a mattress would never think of taking on a total
cost of several thousand dollars to obtain an entire bedroom suite.
After successfully paying for a mattress for a few weeks, however,
the customer may add different pieces of the bedroom set incre-
mentally until finally being committed to a large weekly payment
and a very large total cost. Because the customer comes into a store
displaying new items and talks to salespeople to make payments
each week, the rent-to-own customer faces a particularly powerful
risk of renting more products than initially anticipated.
For some consumer advocates, deficient self-control and mis-
wanting serve as the real justifications for banning or severely
restricting rent-to-own firms. Advocates urge that "most people
simply are trying to live beyond their means 2 7  and that customers
275. Id. at 251.
276. Id.; see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCYAND CONSUMER CREDITIN AMERICA 170-79 (1989)
(referring to this phenomenon as "the seductiveness of incremental irresponsibility").
277. Rodgers, supra note 51.
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must be "protected from their own folly."27 Though they do not
articulate it, their position relies on my argument that rent-to-own
firms sell quality-of-life enhancing goods, not true essentials for life.
These consumer advocates do not want consumers making choices
to get luxury goods from rent-to-own stores when consumers can get
essential goods for much less.
This aggressive form of paternalism justifies severely limiting
rent-to-own transactions, but it looks nothing like the weak and
asymmetric paternalism advocated by behavioral economists. A
paternalism that denies customers choices-even if those customers
are informed-will not likely have much currency with policy-
makers. Moreover, it is not easy to justify other choices we allow
people to make if we will not allow them to obtain luxury goods at
a higher cost. Should poor people be banned from shopping at
Neiman Marcus? On balance, this aggressive, choice-denying
paternalism probably lacks the power to sway many regulators in
the current political environment.
Even without aggressive paternalism, however, regulators can
confront problems of self-control, miswanting, and cumulative cost
neglect. The answer, this Part has argued, is not to ban or severely
restrict the entire transaction, but to tailor regulations to address
these cognitive failures as well as the other failures identified in
this Part. Part III takes up that task.
III. INTELLIGENT REGULATING
The final Part of this Article applies the rich understanding of the
rent-to-own business constructed in Part I to the paternalistic
justifications for regulation in Part II to generate recommendations
about what regulations policymakers should impose on rent-to-own
companies.
A. Annual Percentage Rate Disclosures
One commonly suggested regulation is a requirement that rent-
to-own companies disclose the implied APR of transactions.
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota all require rent-to-own com-
278. Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 387.
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panies to disclose the implied APRs.179 Vermont's statute compels
the attorney general to adopt requirements for "full and conspicuous
disclosure[s] ,, 280 and the attorney general has promulgated regula-
tions requiring rent-to-own firms to disclose effective APRs on price
tags and in contracts.21' The regulation defines "effective annual
percentage rate" as
the annual percentage rate of the merchandise subject to a rent-
to-own transaction, calculated in the same manner as an annual
percentage rate under section 107 of the federal Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1606, except that (a) in place of the
finance charge, there shall be substituted the difference between
the total of payments to acquire ownership and the cash price,
less any amounts specifically excluded from the finance charge
under the Truth in Lending Act; (b) in place of the amount
financed, there shall be substituted the cash price less any
downpayment; and (c) it shall be assumed that the consumer
will pay the total of payments to acquire ownership in the
merchandise." 2
Legal academics have overwhelmingly supported APR disclosure
283regimes. In contrast, this Article argues that APR disclosures for
the rent-to-own transaction are a strong paternalistic measure that
severely limits or eliminates consumer choice, effectively banning
the industry. The case for APR disclosures is especially weak
because for most customers, an APR that is based on the total cost
of the transaction is inaccurate or inappropriate.
Requiring disclosures, including APR disclosures, is "[t]he most
obvious example"2 of a weak paternalistic regulation because
customers, despite having the new information, still have the
279. Minnesota and Wisconsin both require APR disclosures because of judicial decisions.
See Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that rent-to-own
transactions were credit sales under Minnesota's Consumer Credit Sales Act); Rent-A-Center,
Inc. v. Hall, 510 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Wisconsin's consumer
credit sale act covered rent-to-own transactions).
280. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41b(a) (2006).
281. Vt. Att'y Gen., Vermont Consumer Fraud Rule CF 115.04(b)(4) (requiring disclosure
on price tag); 115.05(b) (requiring disclosure in contract).
282. Vt. Att'y Gen., Vermont Consumer Fraud Rule CF 115.08(d).
283. See, e.g., Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 394-95; Pimentel, supra note 12, at 380-
81.
284. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 260.
2102 [Vol. 49:2041
RENTING THE GOOD LIFE
choice to enter the transaction. Additionally, disclosure regulations
are the "most ubiquitous and recognizable form" of asymmetrically
paternalistic regulation because they benefit the irrational and
uninformed customers while imposing few costs on informed
customers who may ignore them or on businesses who can easily
calculate and post the disclosures.285 In fact, in their discussion of
asymmetric paternalism, Camerer et al. specifically suggest that
requiring rent-to-own companies to disclose implied APRs would not
affect customers who knew the true costs but instead would only
help the uninformed:
The final prices that consumers pay are high [in rent-to-own
transactions]-typically two or three times normal retail price
of the good-and the implicit interest rates, if one views these
contracts as loans, are astronomical-100% per year or more. An
asymmetrically paternalistic regulation might force firms to
clearly state the true cost of purchasing an item, along with the
interest rate implied by doing so. Provision of such information
would help consumers who would otherwise enter the transac-
tion without understanding the economic ramifications, while
not affecting those who understand the true cost from the
beginning.2"
This analysis, however, does not account for the facts on the
ground. In the rent-to-own context, requiring APR disclosures is
more like a strong, symmetric paternalistic measure because it
drives most-and the biggest-rent-to-own companies from the
jurisdiction, thus limiting or eliminating consumer choice. The most
powerful evidence of this claim is Rent-A-Center's categorical re-
fusal to operate rent-to-own stores in states with APR disclosures.28 '
Rent-A-Center's complete withdrawal from the rent-to-own business
in Wisconsin in response to APR disclosure requirements demon-
strates its commitment to this policy.288 Considering the fact that
Rent-A-Center represents 44 percent of the rent-to-own market
285. Camerer et al., supra note 6, at 1232.
286. Id. at 1231-32 (internal citations omitted).
287. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
288. See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
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nationally," 9 APR disclosure requirements severely limit the
competition and consumer choice in states that enact them.
The mere fact that Rent-A-Center refuses to operate in states
with APR disclosure requirements should give regulators reason to
pause because the market benefits from larger operators like Rent-
A-Center.29 ° Large firms realize economies of scale,291 so they should
be able to charge less to customers."' Also, unlike smaller firms,
which can be judgment-proof, large firms face the risk of actually
having to pay damages if customers sue them for illicit behavior.9 '
Finally, large firms are more attuned to reputational damage that
might result from malfeasance.294
Beyond Rent-A-Center, the behavior of other rent-to-own firms
also reveals the extent to which APR disclosures eliminate com-
petition. Aaron Rents describes APR disclosure requirements as
"disadvantageous or otherwise materially adverse to us."'295 In
addition, while it was in business, Rent-Way had no operations in
jurisdictions that required APR disclosures.296 Small firms also react
to APR disclosures. In Vermont, where APR disclosures are man-
dated by statute,297 only sixteen stores operate, and in Minnesota,
289. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
290. For an analysis of this same argument in the credit card and payday lending markets,
see MANN, supra note 49, at 191, and Mann & Hawkins, supra note 5, at 906-08. But see
KARGER, supra note 27, at 201-02 (arguing that large national providers are worse for
customers because, inter alia, they have more lobbying power).
291. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 8-9; see Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 2.
292. See Briley Interview, supra note 96 (indicating that he can charge less as an Aaron
Rents franchise because Aaron Rents can ship different goods to his store in one truck,
whereas he requires multiple trucks to obtain different types of merchandise as a smaller
operation ordering from multiple wholesalers).
293. For instance, as of December 2006, Rent-A-Center "had accrued $77.0 million relating
to probable losses for [its] outstanding litigation." Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 30;
see also Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 515, 543 (2007) ('The primary deterrent to predatory lending in the American legal
system is the risk of compensating victims for damages they have sustained. Indeed the
threat of damages is the primary tool used to enforce most law in our system. This is why the
growing trend ofjudgment proof commercial enterprises, particularly higher risk enterprises,
is such a troubling development.").
294. Mann, supra note 70, at 391 & n.79.
295. Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 20.
296. Rent-Way, Inc., supra note 32, at 6.
297. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
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there are only eleven stores.298 It is estimated that rent-to-own
companies would open somewhere between 150299 and 300300 more
rent-to-own stores if Wisconsin changed its requirements, but there
are currently only fifty-seven rent-to-own stores operating there
today.3° ' Conversely, one industry source has contended that the
proposed New York legislation containing an APR disclosure
requirement "would eliminate the rent-to-own business in New
York." '302
We might wonder, however, if the market is not better off without
these operators who refuse to operate in jurisdictions requiring APR
disclosures. The strong aversion to disclosures is truly remarkable
-rent-to-own firms would rather have price controls-in place than
APR disclosures.0 3 This might suggest that framing plays an
acutely strong role in the market: Firms dislike APR disclosures, we
might suppose, because they want to frame the transactions in
unique terms, perhaps to shield themselves from competing with
other credit options that disclose APRs.
The better view, I think, is that there are credible reasons that a
legitimate operator would oppose APR disclosures. First, rent-to-
own operators are very suspicious that courts will flaunt legislative
enactments and treat the rent-to-own transaction as a credit sale
and not a lease, 304 and operators oppose implied APR disclosures
because they cause the transaction to look like a credit sale.30 5
Operators act carefully to avoid the impression that the transaction
is a credit sale, for instance, by not doing credit checks because they
298. APRO, State RTO Statutes, supra note 11.
299. Paul Gores, Will Legislators Buy Rent-to-Own Bill?; Industry Pushes Measure that
Would Establish New Rules, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 10, 2005, at D3.
300. Jeremy Janes, Editorial, Rent-to-Own Industry Up to Old Tricks, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 10,
2005, at A6.
301. APRO, State RTO Statutes, supra note 11.
302. Jonathan D. Epstein, Bill Would Control Rent-to-Own Industry; Consumer Advocates
Say Measure Doesn't Go Far Enough, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 31, 2007, at B1 (quoting
Christopher Korst, General Counsel for Rent-A-Center); see also Lewallen Interview, supra
note 50 (claiming APR disclosure requirements would destroy the rent-to-own business).
303. See infra Part III.B.
304. The industry wants federal rent-to-own legislation precisely because of the fear that
courts will categorize the transaction as a credit sale. Briley Interview, supra note 96; Winn
Interview, supra note 127.
305. See Winn Interview, supra note 127 (noting that the real problem with APR
disclosures is that they are misleading).
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are not extending credit.3"6 Closely related to this objection is the
position that customers should not compare renting-to-own to credit
sales, via implied APRs, because the product is simply different
-the customer does not take on any debt in a rent-to-own agree-
ment, so the customer assumes less risk than when signing a credit
contract." 7 Finally, operators contend that calculating implied APRs
is impossible. APRs are dependent on the base value of the goods
and services provided, which is difficult to determine for the reasons
explained in the next paragraph. Moreover, the cash price of goods
is easy to inflate if an unscrupulous operator wishes the APR to
appear lower.08
The preceding argument demonstrates that APR disclosures are
not weak or asymmetrically paternalistic because they severely
limit consumer choice by eliminating the vast majority of market
participants. In addition, they also fall outside the rubric of asym-
metric paternalism because they impose high costs on rent-to-own
firms. It is not immediately clear how a rent-to-own firm should
calculate the APR. Should it base the APR off only the sale price of
the good or should it include the value of the other services that
rent-to-own companies provide but other creditors do not? Rent-to-
own firms do not charge the customer for the costs of delivery,
maintenance, or replacement, and there is potential for reinstate-
ment if the agreement is terminated.0 9 Dealers who include too few
or too many of these other fees in the APR calculation risk liability
under state deceptive trade practices laws,310 so these requirements
impose real costs on dealers.
This strong, symmetric paternalistic measure could still be
justified if the benefits to consumers were compelling. The evidence,
however, that APR disclosures benefit uninformed or irrational
customers is weak. Consumer advocates and academics posit that
APR disclosures permit customers to compare acquiring goods
306. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
307. Lewallen Interview, supra note 50; Vail Interview, supra note 50. For this reason,
Rent-A-Center will not give its business, so to speak, to states that make the public policy
choice to treat rent-to-own transactions like credit sales. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
308. Carrico Interview, supra note 45.
309. Hearing on Regulatory Relief Proposals Before the S. Banking Comm., 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Christopher A. Korst, General Counsel for Rent-A-Center), available at
http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/public/_files/korst.pdf.
310. See Janes, supra note 300.
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through renting-to-own to other credit products like small loans or
credit cards.31' This argument certainly has force, as 44 percent of
rent-to-own customers have credit cards.312 But, it is not clear that
customers understand or use APRs because people measure costs in
real dollar amounts" 3 and lack the financial literacy to realize
APR's importance.1 4
Furthermore, for many rent-to-own customers, the APR is not a
relevant figure. At least 30 percent of customers do not purchase the
goods, so APR is not an appropriate disclosure. 315 More to the point,
one industry source believes only 2 percent of customers acquire
ownership by paying the weekly fees through the life of the
agreement.1 6 Most who acquire ownership do so by paying some-
thing less than the "total cost" under the contract by purchasing
part way through the agreement. For everyone except the 2 percent
that pay the total cost, the APR is inaccurate. 31 '7 By forcing rent-to-
own firms to disclose this largely irrelevant figure, regulators are
likely diluting the importance of other disclosures because custom-
ers get more information than they can process.
Based on the justifications for regulating rent-to-own transac-
tions, the case for requiring APR disclosures is suspect. Not only
311. See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 27, at 8; Janes, supra note 300.
312. See Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 130.
313. See Hellwig, supra note 267, at 1593.
314. See id. at 1591-92; see also Hastak, supra note 28, at 92.
315. Hastak, supra note 28, at 92. Even Martin and Huckins, who suggest that "[a]ny [rent-
to-own] disclosure law that intends to provide useful information to consumers should include
an APR equivalency rate," admit this problem: APRs are relevant for customers who purchase
the goods but not the most meaningful measure of cost for customers who terminate the
agreement before ownership. Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 394-95; see also Winn
Interview, supra note 127 (claiming that APR disclosure regimes require the pretense that
all customers will rent long enough to own the merchandise).
316. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
317. See Anderson & Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements, supra note 20, at 18.
318. Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Financial Services Comm.,
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Todd J. Zywicki, Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. of
Law), available at http://www.house.gov/appsllist/hearing/financialsvcs-demlhtzywicki
042607.pdf (arguing that "mandating some disclosures necessarily makes it more difficult to
disclose fully other card terms that some consumers may care more about or may make it
more difficult for consumers to find the information that they care about"); Camerer et al.,
supra note 6, at 1235 ("One important cost is the negative effect of new information on the
likelihood of consumers paying attention to existing information as consumers begin to suffer
from 'information overload."').
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would this requirement likely eliminate the benefits these operators
provide, but it also is strongly paternalistic without clear benefits
to customers.
B. Price Controls
Nine states statutorily impose limits on the total costs that
rent-to-own firms may charge customers: Connecticut, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia.319 New Jersey's Supreme Court also recently imposed this
requirement by holding that rent-to-own agreements were subject
to the retail sales statute. ° Connecticut's statute, as an example,
states that "[n]o lessor shall offer a rent-to-own agreement in which
the total of rental payments necessary to acquire ownership exceeds
twice the cash price of the rented property." '' "Cash price" is
defined in the statute to mean "the price at which a lessor in the
ordinary course of business would in good faith offer the property
that is the subject of a rent-to-own agreement to the lessee for cash
on the date of the rent-to-own agreement. 322
Usury limits in other credit markets have often resulted in
effectively banning credit products.3 23 So far, however, the current
price controls have not had this effect in the rent-to-own industry
because they are high enough to allow operators to function. The
current caps all require the total cost of the rental agreement to be
less than 2 or 2.4 times the purchase price of the goods,324 and rent-
319. Ed Winn III, APRO's Legal Counsel, Rent-to-Own State Rules and Regulations 4,
http://www.rtohq.org/rent-to-own/wp-content/uploads/LegUpdate-2006.pdf (last visited Apr.
7, 2008).
320. See Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 2006).
321. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-248(a) (West 2007). Another common formulation of a
price control is found in Ohio's law:
No lessor shall offer a lease-purchase agreement in which fifty per cent of all
lease payments necessary to acquire ownership of the leased property exceed the
cash price of the leased property. When fifty per cent of all lease payments made
by a lessee equals the cash price of the property disclosed to the lessee ..., the
lessee shall acquire ownership of the leased property and the lease-purchase
agreement shall terminate.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.06(A) (West 2004).
322. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-240(2) (West 2007).
323. See e.g., Littwin, supra note 5, at 454 n.7 (citing empirical studies that have
established that usury limits are associated with restricted access to credit cards).
324. See Winn, supra note 319.
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to-own firms indicate that the total cost of ownership for most of
their merchandise is around double the cash price.32 Rent-to-own
firms continue to operate in these states, as demonstrated by the
high number of stores in states with caps, such as 405 stores in
Ohio, 267 in New York, and 236 in Pennsylvania. 326 Rent-A-Center's
decision to continue operating in New Jersey after the supreme
court in Perez applied price controls to renting-to-own also illus-
trates the fact that price controls do not eliminate consumer choice
in the same way as APR disclosures.327
Price controls partially address the concerns raised by deficient
self-control and miswanting by limiting how much money customers
can "waste" on products that are not in their best interest. By
capping the total cost consumers pay at two times the purchase
price, policymakers prevent uncontrolled, miswanting consumers
who would pay three or four times the purchase price from doing so.
As long as the price controls are not set too low that they drive a
significant number of participants out of the market, policymakers
who want to limit the effects of these weaknesses can do so without
completely eliminating the option for customers to rent-to-own.
C. Lifetime Reinstatement Rights
Most states currently require rent-to-own firms to reinstate
terminated agreements if the customer (1) returns the property to
the company and (2) makes a new payment within a limited number
of days, ranging from 21 days to 180 days. 28 Ohio's provision, for
example, states that a customer "who fails to make timely lease
payments has the right to reinstate the original lease-purchase
agreement without losing any rights or options previously acquired
under the lease-purchase agreement within three lease terms after
the expiration of the last lease term, 329 if the customer "surrenders
the leased property to the lessor" when asked to do So 330 and if the
customer pays "any unpaid lease payments, delinquency charges, a
325. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
326. See APRO, State RTO Statutes, supra note 11.
327. Korst Interview, supra note 9.
328. See Winn, supra note 319, at 2.
329. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.05(A) (West 2004).
330. Id.
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reasonable reinstatement fee of not more than five dollars, and a
delivery charge" if these charges are required by the rent-to-own
store.33' Connecticut's statute treats customers differently based on
what percentage of the total cost they have paid, mandating that
customers who have paid more than two-thirds of the total cost have
180 days to reinstate, whereas customers who have paid less than
a third only have thirty days.332
Although states may allow customers more or less time to seek
reinstatement, no state requires firms to reinstate any agreement
regardless of how much time has passed since the agreement was
terminated, and Massachusetts has no reinstatement require-
ment. 33 This section argues that there is a strong case for a pater-
nalistic regulation requiring rent-to-own firms to offer lifetime
reinstatement rights, despite my earlier argument that lost equity
does not justify prohibiting rent-to-own transactions.3 4 Even if a
customer lets the agreement lapse for several months, the rent-to-
own company would be obligated to let the customer pick up at the
same point in the payment schedule if the customer paid off the fees
and rental payment due. The company would give the customer the
same goods, if it still had them, or suitable replacement goods, and
would allow the customer to continue the progression towards
ownership.
Behavioral law and economics predicts that boundedly rational
customers would need lifetime reinstatement rights. People are
prone to procrastinate making their rental payments, and if they
make them after the due date, they risk terminating their agree-
ments. Empirical evidence confirms that many customers rely on
reinstatement to keep the goods they are renting and to acquire
ownership of the goods. Analysis of the FTC Survey revealed that
"customers in states with reinstatement laws [are] more likely to
ultimately purchase the merchandise than are customers in other
331. Id. § 1351.05(B).
332. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-246(a)(1)-(3) (West 2007).
333. See Winn, supra note 319, at 2.
334. In Part II.A.3, I concluded that the loss of equity was not a reason for regulators to
ban rent-to-own transactions because customers do not lose equity and firms can offer lifetime
reinstatement. That section concluded that customers do not lose equity; though related, this
section makes the distinct point that customers without lifetime reinstatement rights do face
high costs in acquiring new goods because they have to start their rental agreements over
again.
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states.""33 Earlier surveys made even more striking findings: 60
percent of Rent-A-Center's "customers make late payments at any
given time, and more than 60% of these persons pay the reinstate-
ment fee to avoid terminability. 336
Without lifetime reinstatement rights, customers feel the full
effect of the industry's high switching costs-they are forced to
switch to a new store or product when their contract terminates, so
they have to pay the total cost of ownership all over again.3 7 Rent-
A-Center, Aaron Rents, and Show-Me Rent-to-Own's business
decisions to offer lifetime reinstatement demonstrate that firms can
successfully operate while offering lifetime reinstatement, so this
regulation would not severely restrict the industry.338 States are
justified in imposing lifetime reinstatement requirements.
D. Behavior-driven Fees and Bundling
If a customer pays late, reinstates a lapsed rental contract,
requires a store to pick up an item after the contract lapses, or
requires the company to redeliver an item after a contract is
reinstated, the rent-to-own company charges a fee that is above the
actual cost to the company caused by the customer's behavior.
Currently, every jurisdiction permits firms to charge late fees,
though some states put limits on the amount of these fees, some-
where between three and fifteen dollars.339 Some states permit a
reinstatement fee, a collection fee, and a redelivery fee. 4° Ohio's
statute again provides a useful example because, although it limits
the reinstatement fee a lessor may charge to five dollars, it places
no restrictions on other fees that the statute explicitly permits,
including "delinquency charges" and "a delivery charge., 341 Further-
335. McKernan et al., supra note 43, at 51.
336. Hill et al., supra note 27, at 4.
337. A customer's switching costs could be mitigated if the customer rents a used item that
is roughly as old as the forfeited item. But, some stores focus almost entirely on new goods,
so customers might not have this option. More importantly, rent-to-own firms would likely
charge more for used goods of roughly the same age because the firm undertakes the costs
associated with detailing and marketing the used goods.
338. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
339. See Winn, supra note 319, at 4.
340. See id.
341. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.05(B) (West 2004).
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more, Montana's statute places no limits whatsoever on the fees
dealers can charge.1
42
These fees are troubling because they exploit customers' inclina-
tions to procrastinate.141 Also, firms do not compete for customers
based on the amount of their behavior-driven fees. These fees are
not disclosed at the start of the transaction; consumers' expectations
are anchored to the weekly payment amount;3 44 the fees' cumulative
effects are difficult even for the astute customer to calculate;3 45 and
customers discount the importance of late fees since they are overly
optimistic about the likelihood that they will have to pay any.
3 46
These fees increase the effective total cost of the rent-to-own trans-
action, but the disclosures of total cost do not reflect the increase.347
A rent-to-own consumer faces a greater risk of paying behavior-
driven fees than a credit card holder or someone using a payday
loan because most rental contracts require weekly payments-every
week a customer must overcome problems with procrastination, or
the customer will have to pay a late fee and a reinstatement fee.348
In the same way, rent-to-own firms do not likely compete on the
basis of bundled products such as insurance and preferred customer
programs. Some states prohibit dealers from offering optional
damage waivers and property insurance.349 California allows a
consumer to void any contract containing "any provision by which
... [t]he consumer agrees to purchase from the lessor insurance or a
liability waiver against loss or damage to the rental property. 35 °
Other states limit the fees dealers can charge, but many states
342. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-19-101 to -116 (2007).
343. See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 269.
344. See supra Part II.B.2.
345. Nehf, supra note 12, at 824.
346. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 269.
347. See U.K. DEP'T OFTRADE & INDUS., supra note 99, 3.2.1(iii) fig. 14 ("Unless borrowers
maintain a perfect payment record, the cost of credit to the consumer will be significantly
higher than the APR would suggest."); see also Martin & Huckins, supra note 7, at 402
(recounting consumer advocates' complaints that customers cannot know the true cost of the
transaction because of additional fees).
348. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. But see Johnston, supra note 6, at 873
(noting that customers were satisfied with how rent-to-own stores treated them in dealing
with their late payments and that a common practice is giving managers discretion to forgive
late fees).
349. See Winn, supra note 319, at 4.
350. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.624(a)(3) (West 1998).
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permit rent-to-own firms to sell bundled products without any limit
on the fees charged.35'
Policymakers should be concerned about bundling products
because in addition to exploiting the anchoring effect, bundling
products also permits rent-to-own firms to exploit consumers'
propensities toward cumulative cost neglect. If the cost of insurance
was presented at the start of the transaction as part of the total cost
or weekly payment amount, customers might decide not to rent
because of the high cost, but they are less likely, after having
already decided to rent, to turn down the additional cost when they
are signing the contract at the end of the transaction. Furthermore,
unsophisticated customers will likely have problems estimating the
likelihood they will need insurance or understanding the benefits of
a preferred program. These calculations involve weighing the future
and present value of the money spent on the bundled product versus
unknown future costs.
In light of these concerns, regulators should consider whether
behavior-driven fees and bundled products should be sources of
profit for rent-to-own companies. In the United Kingdom, regulators
have proposed a fixed cap on late fees equal to the amount of
the administrative costs to the company.352 California has a similar
cap in place already. The statute forbids contracts requiring the
customer "to pay any fee permitted by the rental-purchase agree-
ment and this title that is not reasonable and actually incurred by
the lessor. The lessor has the burden of proof to establish that a fee
was reasonable and was an actual cost incurred by the lessor."''
Given the structure of the rent-to-own transaction and the cognitive
defects these characteristics exploit, regulators are justified in
placing restrictions on these aspects of the transaction.
351. See Winn, supra note 319, at 4. Montana, again, is an example of a state with no limits
on bundled products. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-19-101 to -116 (2007).
352. MANN, supra note 49, at 152.
353. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.624(a)(7) (West 1998). One problem with imposing caps based
on the cost to the rent-to-own firm is that rent-to-own firms are left in the unenviable position
of determining and announcing the "actual" or "reasonable" cost of behavior-driven fees and
bundled products. Determining the cost is difficult for firms, and an erroneous or even
questionable determination subjects a firm to litigation costs. The risk of litigation and the
expenses associated with determining the costs of behavior-driven fees and bundled products
may drive up the price of renting-to-own for consumers. Thus, regulators must weigh these
costs against the benefits of caps on behavior-driven fees and bundled products.
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E. Cooling-off Periods and Monthly Contract Defaults
The practice of having weekly payments that are made in person
at a store poses a risk that rent-to-own companies will exploit their
personal relationships with customers and put customers in more
rental products than the customers really want or need. Rent-to-
own companies are upfront about both the importance of repeat
business 54 and the conscious effort to develop personal relation-
ships with customers to obtain a competitive advantage. 355 This use
of personal power to obtain a business advantage, however, is
troubling. John Commons, for instance, believed that courts use the
unconscionability doctrine to prevent parties from using personal
power to abuse personal trust in order to extract excessive profits:
"'[I]t is perfectly lawful ... to exercise superior economic power or
superior mental and managerial faculties, over others, provided
advantage is not taken of recognized special relations of confidence,
trust, dependence, or the like.' 356 Furthermore, customers suffering
from cumulative cost neglect will be likely to rent more items than
they intended in their initial visit if these items are rented during
a series of visits to a store over time.
Because of this risk of exploitation, regulations could impose
cooling-off periods, though no state has chosen this path yet in the
rent-to-own industry. But, in other contexts, individuals prone to
cognitive failures have a right to cancel an agreement within a
short time period. Texas's Structured Settlement Protection Act, for
instance, protects litigants from their own decisions by mandating
that firms entering into structured settlement contracts with
individuals include a bold "statement that the payee has the right
to cancel the transfer agreement, without penalty or further
obligation, not later than the third business day after the date the
agreement is signed by the payee." '57
If customers are given a chance to return rented goods with no
fees, then rent-to-own firms will be motivated to make sure a
354. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 13; Rent-A-Center, Inc., supra note 32, at 1.
355. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 7.
356. Daniel T. Ostas, Economics and the Law of Unconscionability, 27 J. ECON. ISSUES 647,
652 (1993) (quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 58-59 (1924) and
explicating Commons's view).
357. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 141.003(8) (Vernon 2005).
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customer really wants and can afford new merchandise before
attempting to rent new merchandise to a current customer.358 The
cost of delivering and picking up the goods would be very high, so
firms would take great effort to help consumers make good choices.
Another less invasive regulatory response, also absent in the
current regulations, is setting a monthly term as the default term
in rent-to-own contracts. Aaron Rents has prospered offering pri-
marily monthly lease terms, demonstrating that this sort of
regulation will not eliminate the profitability of rent-to-own
stores.359 If regulations required firms to advertise monthly prices
instead of weekly prices and to write rental agreements with
monthly terms as the default, customers would be more likely to
choose a monthly term,36° and firms would have less opportunity to
sell their existing consumers multiple products. This sort of default
is asymmetrically paternalistic because fully rational consumers
could opt out of the monthly default and choose a weekly contract
term.361
F. Disclosures
Disclosures are "the least controversial mode of legal interven-
tion," '362 so the task of justifying disclosure regulations is less
onerous than justifying other intrusive statutes. This is especially
true for rent-to-own because market participants themselves
actively promote disclosure regulations. The proposed federal rent-
to-own bill backed heavily by the industry requires that, at a
minimum, price tags disclose the total weeks required to acquire the
item and the total cost. 63 In some jurisdictions, the rent-to-own
358. See Camerer et al., supra note 6, at 1240 (explaining how cooling-off periods motivate
salespeople to ensure the customer "has deliberated about the costs and benefits of the
purchase").
359. See Aaron Rents, Inc., supra note 32, at 9 ("Approximately 78% of our sales and lease
ownership agreements are monthly and approximately 22% are semi-monthly as compared
to the industry standard of weekly agreements.").
360. See Camerer et al., supra note 6, at 1225 ("[Flor boundedly rational people who have
a status quo bias, the choice of defaults is important.").
361. Id. ("As long as actively making a choice requires very little effort, the choice of
defaults has essentially no effect on fully rational consumers.").
362. Bar-Gill, supra note 150, at 1378.
363. The proposed House bill, H.R. 1767, sets out the following price tag disclosure
requirements:
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industry has already successfully urged legislatures to adopt the
same strict disclosure requirements that prominent academics ask
legislatures to enact.364
Legislation that requires rent-to-own firms to use price tags to
disclose the total costs of ownership and the time required to obtain
ownership makes perfect sense. Without such disclosures, some
people probably start rent-to-own agreements not knowing how
much it will end up costing them, so they may make irrational
rental decisions.3 65 Forcing firms to calculate and post total cost and
total time information costs almost nothing to the firm, which can
easily use a calculator to accomplish the task. Moreover, it is more
efficient for the firm to calculate the total cost once than for
hundreds of shoppers to do the calculations independently.366 No one
rationally using the service is prevented from doing so by the
disclosure, so the disadvantages of such disclosures are low. Most
important of all, requiring these disclosures on the price tag and not
just the rental contract ensures that customers can evaluate their
options with minimal transaction costs and that customers get the
information in a timely manner-before critical information is lost
in a sea of contract terms and before customers have already
committed to the purchase in their own minds.3 67 Though much ink
SEC. 1010. POINT-OF-RENTAL DISCLOSURES.
(a) In General- For any item of property or set of items displayed or offered for rental-
purchase, the merchant shall display on or next to the item or set of items a card, tag,
or label that clearly and conspicuously discloses the following:
(1) A brief description of the property.
(2) Whether the property is new or used.
(3) The cash price of the property.
(4) The amount of each rental payment.
(5) The total number of rental payments necessary to acquire ownership of the property.
(6) The rental-purchase cost.
Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act, H.R. 1767, 110th Cong. § 1010(a) (2007), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cllO:H.R. 1767:.
364. Carrico Interview, supra note 45 (explaining his role in getting legislation passed in
Illinois that required disclosures on price tags of weekly payment amount, number of weeks
required for ownership, total payment amount, and new or used status). This exact legislation
has been suggested by economists Lacko and Hastak. See Hastak, supra note 28, at 92; Lacko
et al., supra note 19, at 135.
365. See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 251 (noting that the most obvious reason people
borrow excessively is inadequate information).
366. Lacko et al., supra note 19, at 135.
367. Hastak, supra note 28, at 92 (explaining, based on research about the confirmation
bias, that "[d]isclosure of total cost on only the rental agreement is unlikely to be useful to
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has been spilled over whether disclosures alone are effective to
protect consumers, the case for requiring disclosures of total cost in
the rent-to-own industry is strong.
CONCLUSION
Proceeding on the premise that the best regulations are those
that solve real problems, this Article has addressed a fundamental
question: Which regulations are policymakers justified in imposing
on the rent-to-own industry to protect consumers? I generated novel
insights into the rent-to-own business by combining interviews with
industry participants with the best empirical data available. With
the backdrop of this rich understanding, this Article has argued that
the case for a ban or severe regulations is difficult to make out.
Though the cost of using rent-to-own is high, no causative link
exists between renting-to-own and financial distress, customers do
not appear to lose significant equity through the transaction, and
cognitive failures are not so pronounced in this market that they
warrant intervention on a large scale. Instead, regulators should
pursue narrow, specifically tailored regulations that address the
cognitive weakness rent-to-own customers are most likely to exhibit.
Overregulating this industry is not consumer protection. Instead,
excessive regulation denies customers the opportunity to engage in
beneficial transactions and robs them of the right to make choices
about their own futures.
consumers, because they have already decided to enter into the rental transaction"). These
arguments all assume that both parties speak the language of the disclosure, which of course
is not always the case. See Siegesmund & Weaver, supra note 248, at 228.
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